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Gender and family stability:
Dissolution of the first parental union
in Sweden and Hungary.
Livia Sz. Oláh
Abstract
The increasing trend of partnership disruption among families with children in recent
decades has been accompanied by substantial changes in traditional gender roles in
industrialized countries. Yet, relatively little is known about the effects of changing
gender relations on family stability in the European context. In this paper, we study such
gender influences at the familial and societal level in Sweden and Hungary between the
mid-1960s and the early 1990s. We focus on the disruption of the first parental union
(i.e. the union in which a couple’s first child was born). Our analysis is based on data
extracted from the Swedish and Hungarian Fertility and Family Surveys of 1992/93. We
use the method of hazard regression. The results suggest (i) that the establishment of the
dual-earner family model influences family stability only if it is accompanied by some
changes in traditional gender relations within the family, and (ii) that women’s and
men’s labor-market behavior have different effects in spite of the relatively long history
of women’s (also mothers’) labor-force participation in both Sweden and Hungary.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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1. Introduction
In recent decades, family stability has decreased substantially in most industrialized
countries. This was seen both in increasing divorce rates and in the growing prevalence
of non-marital cohabiting relationships, which are usually more fragile than marriages
(Da Vanzo and Rahman 1993, Kaa 1994). Partnership dissolution among families with
children has also become more and more common.
As the demographic changes have been accompanied by greatly increasing labor-
force participation among women, even among mothers with young children, theoretical
explanations of new family patterns have focused mainly on women’s increasing
economic independence (Becker 1991) but also on ideational changes such as growing
individualism and other value shifts (Lesthaeghe 1983, Kaa 1987). Although these
influential theories point to the importance of gender relations for family stability at
least indirectly, it has not been studied much in demographic research except for the US.
In spite of important changes in the gender context all over the developed world,
we thus know relatively little about the mechanisms of the potential interplay between
family stability and changing gender relations linked to the interrelationship between
women’s rapidly increasing employment rates and changes in (the demands on) men’s
involvement in childrearing and domestic responsibilities. Also, our knowledge about
whether men’s characteristics have different effects than women’s characteristics on
family dissolution is rather limited. Such gender differences are likely to exist based on
the gendered nature of family life. Hence, the purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, we
are interested in the impact of changing gender relations on family stability. Second, we
intend to shed more light on gender differences that may affect family disruption.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1 General framework
In our attempt to study the potential influence of changing gender relations on family
dissolution we use a theoretical framework based on previous research on the link
between union break-up and (i) women’s labor market work, (ii) the household division
of labor in the light of theories about distributive justice, and (iii) gender-role attitudes,
as in what follows.
In the extensive (and mainly American) literature women’s employment has been
associated with marital instability for a long time, based on three types of arguments.
Women’s labor-force participation destabilizes the marriage (1) by overthrowingDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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traditional marriage norms, (2) by facilitating divorce in case of conflicts in the
relationship, or (3) by taking women away from their traditional responsibilities at
home, which in turn generates conflicts between the spouses. (For an overview see
Greenstein 1990). A number of studies have found that the risk of family dissolution
increases with the number of working hours per week for women. (For an overview see
Greenstein 1995). The relationship between these factors is likely to be more complex,
however, as also work schedules, gender ideology, and women’s perceptions of the
fairness of the division of domestic responsibilities within the family seem to have an
important (direct or indirect) influence (Blair 1993, Greenstein 1995, Presser 2000,
Sanchez and Gager 2000). Such perceptions are shaped by ”comparison referents” as
women evaluate their own situation by comparing themselves to other women or by
comparing their partner to other men in terms of sharing domestic work within the
family (i.e. within-gender comparisons) (Thompson 1991).
These findings illuminate the effects of gender relations on union stability at the
family level, at least in the US context. It is very likely that there is an interchange
between societal-level gender arrangements and family-level gender relations. As
women and men share the task of economic provision for the family, women’s
traditionally sole responsibility for domestic work becomes perceived not only as unfair
but is also problematic given constraints on time and energy. This generates a demand
among women that their male partner should contribute (more) to the family work.
While female employment is typically accepted by both women and men in the
industrialized world (Scott et al 1996, Panayotova and Brayfield 1997), the division of
unpaid domestic work is a much more controversial issue in most countries, however
(Shelton and John 1996, Braun et al. 1998). Its limited societal acceptance is likely to
counteract women’s claim on men’s engagement in household duties. The lack of
support for the idea that men should share family responsibilities with women is
reflected in public policies. For example, working parents can take parental leave in
many countries but the eligibility of fathers for such rights is often considerably more
restricted than for mothers. In fact, men were not eligible for parental leave before the
1980s or 1990s, except in Scandinavia.
The actual policies and the policy discourse in a country are likely to influence the
development of gender relations at both the family and the societal level either by
promoting or by slowing down changes in traditional gender roles. In the process of
altering gender relations such policy influence on women’s perceptions of the fair share
of family work is probably an important item beside its role for female labor-force
participation. In addition, the mechanisms around women’s employment and family
instability are likely to be somewhat different in societies where the male-breadwinner
norm is the ideal family model than in countries where the dual-earner family model has
a fairly long history (Lewis 1992, Sainsbury 1996). While we have some understandingDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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of these mechanisms in the male-breadwinner setting based on the rich American
literature, our knowledge about societies that pursue the dual-earner family model is
relatively limited. As the gap between male and female employment rates are rapidly
diminishing all over the developed world, we need to increase our efforts to learn more
about the gender dimension of family dissolution in the dual-earner context. This study
makes a modest contribution in that direction.
We have two main hypotheses that we want to test in this study, namely (1) that
changes in gender relations around paid and unpaid work influence family stability, and
(2) that there are gender differences in the effects of the partners’ characteristics,
especially regarding labor-market behavior, that influence family dissolution even in the
dual-earner-family setting.
2.2 Our analytical strategy
We focus on families with children, because the disruption behavior of such families is
of much greater societal concern than the dissolution of childless relationships. Also, the
bargaining process around paid and unpaid work within the family is more strongly
gendered for families with children than it is for childless couples. (See Presser 1994,
Ahrne and Roman 1997, McFarlane et al. 2000.) The dissolution of families with
children is a rather complex event since at least three parties are involved: the woman,
the man, and their child(ren). To reduce the complexity of the issues involved, we focus
in this study on the first parental union, defined as the union in which the first child was
born to a couple where neither partners have children from a previous relationship.
Arguably, entry into parenthood constitutes the most important role transition in adult
individuals’ lives.
The combination of employment and family responsibilities is a key aspect of
changing gender relations, and is a particularly important issue in countries where the
dual-earner family model has become relatively well established. As this is a longish
process, we need to study a calendar period in which traditional gender relations have
been exposed to new requirements inducing a course of changes both at the family level
and at the societal level. For such reasons we focus on Sweden and Hungary, and the
period from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s. We apply a comparative research design
because of the complex nature of the issues we intend to study. It helps us to avoid
generalization based on results specific for a single country alone, and it can help us
detect patterns and mechanisms which are part of a more general trend.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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3. The comparative setting
We have selected Sweden and Hungary for our study for a number of reasons beyond
the fact that we know both societies well and have access to the best data available for
them. In some respects these two countries are similar, at least largely though not always
in the details; in other respects they are really different.
Here is the list of arguments we base this comparison on.
First, in the period we study, the gap between the proportions of women and men
with higher education has greatly diminished both in Sweden and Hungary. In parallel,
women’s labor-force participation has reached high levels as compared to other
industrialized countries. Yet, while Hungarian women have long worked full time just
like men have (Szalai 1991), the proportion of part-time workers has been rather high
among employed women in Sweden (40-50 per cent; see Sundström 1987).
Second, the high level of female employment is commonly connected with the
concept of gender equality. It has a relatively long history as an influential principle of
public policy-making both in Sweden and Hungary. However, what gender equality
consists in has been interpreted somewhat differently in these countries. In Hungary,
the understanding of the issues involved was limited to equal labor force participation of
women and men (Makkai 1994). In  Sweden, the policy discourse has aimed more
broadly at a general transformation of traditional gender roles into a system with equal
participation in paid work but also in family responsibilities for women and men
(Sainsbury 1996).
Third, families with children have received substantial state-support in  both
countries, and  a wide range of social services have facilitated the combination of
employment and parenthood for women (Table A). Some of these policy measures have
induced and/or reinforced changes in gender relations. The parental-leave program is a
clear example of this. In Sweden, fathers have been able to take parental leave on equal
terms with mothers (with 90 per cent income-replacement) ever since 1974. In
Hungary, mothers have been eligible for a long child-care leave with a flat-rate benefit
since the late 1960s. Fathers became eligible first in 1982 and only for children above
age 1. An income-related parental benefit at a 75 per cent replacement level was
introduced in the mid-1980s. The flexibility of the Swedish program (single days and
half- or quarter days can be used) in combination with the high replacement-level of the
benefit have encouraged fathers to engage in active parenting and to use some parental
leave. In contrast, the Hungarian program has been formed so as to show that childcare
is women’s task; fathers are considered as secondary care-givers at best (Adamik 1991).
Not surprisingly, only a few per cent of Hungarian fathers have personal experience of
parental leave. In Sweden one-quarter of all parental leave users were men by the mid-Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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1980s, though they had barely a ten per cent share of the total number of benefit days
(Sundström and Duvander 1999).
Fourth, on some other counts these countries have been very dissimilar. Beside
their divergent histories, geographical positions, economic structures and political
regimes (Baxter and Kane 1995, Panayotova and Brayfield 1997), their family
formation patterns have also been quite different. In  Hungary, childbearing was
essentially restricted to marriage before the 1990s (Klinger 1991), while in Sweden,
non-marital cohabitation has been very common at least since the 1970s, and births have
increasingly occurred in such relationships. In fact, since the mid-1980s the majority of
Swedish couples have been unmarried when they have become parents for the first time
(Hoem 1996). As a number of studies have demonstrated that previous cohabitation and
premarital children usually increase the risk of partnership disruption (for an overview
see White 1990, Lillard et al. 1995), the difference in our countries’ family formation
patterns may have implications for their trends in family stability.
Fifth, both Sweden and Hungary have a long history of liberal divorce legislation
(Table B) and of rather high divorce rates also among families with children (Goode
1993). As for the economic consequences of divorce the rules have been based on the
”clean-break”-theory regarding spousal alimony (none), and property division (even).
While such rules often lead to a severe deterioration of women’s economic situation
after union dissolution (Voydanoff 1990, Holden and Smock 1991, Gähler 1998a) in
other countries, this is not necessarily the case in Sweden and Hungary given the high
level of female employment and extensive social support for families with children,
including for solo mothers. In fact Hungarian fathers also experience economic hardship
after family dissolution as mothers retain the right to live in the couple’s dwelling, while
men, beside a rather high child-support obligation, have to find another place to live,
which has been a hard task considering the housing shortage (Utasi 1999).
Sixth, legal rules allow divorced or separated parents to continue to have joint
custody for their children in both countries (Table B). In Sweden, joint custody means
that parents have to cooperate in important questions regarding their children, such as to
agree on their residence, education, sports and other activities, even though they usually
live in separate households after family break-up (SOU 1995). The joint-custody rule
has led to increased involvement in the children by both parents even after the
relationship ends (Bernhardt 1996), notwithstanding that relatively few parents choose
to share also the physical custody of the children when the family dissolves. In
Hungary, the law requires parents’ cooperation in important decisions regarding their
children even if one parent has sole custody after the dissolution of the union. Yet, many
fathers practically disappear from the children’s life after the family break-up (Kamarás
1986) as mothers have sole custody for the children in the vast majority of cases (Hoóz
1995). Although fathers have visitation rights, they either do not use it or the childrenDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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refuse to meet their fathers, sometimes under the influence of their mothers. So while in
Sweden divorce or separation does not necessarily mean the loss of the parental status
for either parent, Hungarian men often risk losing contact with their children
permanently after a family break-up.
Based on their differences and similarities these countries provide us with an
opportunity for a systematic comparative analysis of gender relations and family
stability.
4. Data and method
The empirical analysis in this study is based on data extracted from the Swedish Survey
of Family and Working Life, conducted by Statistics Sweden in 1992/93, and from the
Hungarian Fertility and Family Survey, conducted by Statistics Hungary in the same
years. Both surveys are part of the European Family and Fertility Surveys program,
concerted by the Population Activities Unit of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe. It aimed at providing data suitable for cross-country
comparisons in demographic analyses. Both women and men, independently selected,
were respondents in the Swedish as well as the Hungarian surveys. This allows us to
study the influence of characteristics of both female partners and male partners on
family dissolution. At the same time we recognize the limitations of the data, given that
the true unit of analysis for family dissolution is couples, not individuals. We have little
information on the partners of the respondents, as is the case for most event history data.
Nevertheless, parallel histories from women and men provide a simulation of sorts of
what we might expect had we information on both male and female partners’
characteristics for each union reported by a woman or by a man.
The empirical material provides us with data on 4984 individuals for Sweden and
5487 individuals for Hungary. We know their childhood family characteristics, their full
retrospective histories of union formation (cohabitation, marriage), childbearing, and
family dissolution, as well as of educational and occupational activities, covering the
period from the 1960s to the early 1990s. Respondents in the Swedish survey were
selected by simple random sampling from each of five national strata of women born in
1949, 1954, 1959, 1964, and 1969, and three strata of men born in 1949, 1959, and
1964. The National Population Register was used as a sampling frame. Interviews were
successfully obtained with 78 per cent of the women and 77 per cent of the men of the
original target sample in Sweden. (For further details see (Granström 1997).) In
Hungary the figures were 87 and 77 per cent, respectively. The Hungarian sample was
nationally representative for the female population at ages 18-41 years and the male
population at ages 20-44 years. The sample was selected partly through one-stageDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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proportional sampling (for the capital and the largest cities) and partly through two-
stage stratified sampling (for the rest of the country). In the first stage for the latter,
sampling areas were stratified according to the number of inhabitants and municipalities
were randomly selected from each stratum. The final sample was drawn at random,
given sex and age constraints, using the National Population Register as the sampling
frame for each stratum (Kamarás 1999).
For the purpose of the present study, we have selected respondents who have
reported one or more marital or non-marital unions and have born at least one child in a
union. Individuals who do not have a recorded union are excluded, as are those who
were childless at interview or whose first child was born outside of a recorded
partnership. From the sample for Sweden we have also excluded respondents who grew
up outside of Scandinavia in order to avoid problems of cultural  differences which
could influence family dissolution risks. From the Hungarian sample we have excluded
respondents who were below age 20 at the interview; only few of them had children
anyway. Also, respondents with incomplete records on partnership or childbearing
history are excluded. As the effects of changing gender relations on parental union
disruption may be difficult to detect, we try to make the samples as homogeneous as
possible. Therefore, we have also excluded respondents who have an adopted child in
their first parental union or whose partner had a child from a previous relationship, as
well as those whose first child in their first parental union died (Note 1) or whose union
ended in the same month as they had their first child. Censoring occurs at sixteen years
after first birth, when a union ends because the respondent’s partner dies, or at
interview, whichever event comes first. A total of 2730 individuals (1869 women and
861 men) are included in the Swedish working sample and 3500 i ndividuals (2430
women and 1070 men) in the Hungarian one. The proportion of respondents who
experienced the disruption of their union is about 20 per cent for Sweden, and 13 per
cent for Hungary. (For further details see Table 1 in Appendix A.)
The analysis is based on a piecewise-constant proportional-hazards model.
Exposure is measured in months, starting from the birth of the first child of the
respondents included and continued until the child turns 16 years old or until censoring
for other reasons. We have divided this period into the following intervals: infancy (age
below 1), toddler years (up to age 3), pre-school years (up to age 6), early and middle
school-age years (up to age 12) (Note 2), and teenage years (up to age 16). We behave
as if the disruption intensity is constant over each of these pre-selected time intervals,
but let it vary between intervals. Information for those who did not experience the
disruption of their first parental union during the period of observation is also taken into
account.
Our computations are based on exposures in half-month units. We pretend that the
interview and all recorded demographic and other events happened at the middle of aDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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calendar month, while changes in period variables occur at the beginning of a calendar
month. The Windows-based software ”RocaNova”, developed at Statistics Sweden, is
used to fit the model. The results, produced as maximum-likelihood estimates of the
effect parameters of the model, are presented in the form of relative risks. We analyze
women and men separately for each country in order to detect possible gender
differences in the effects of partners’ characteristics on family disruption.
5. Variables
5.1 Gender relations
As we have discussed earlier (Section 2.1) changes in gender relations which are
potentially influential on family stability have occurred both at the societal level and at
the family level. We use therefore separate measures in our attempt to estimate their
effects on union dissolution risks.
We start with our measure of changes in policies that affect gender relations at the
societal level but also have implications at the family level. We use a period approach to
define this variable, since policy changes that denote stages of development towards
gender equality in society take place in clearly identifiable calendar years. Alternatively,
we could have used two dichotomous factors for measuring the effects of changes in
legislation around family dissolution (one for divorce laws and the other for custody
rules) in combination with a variable which picks up changes in the parental leave
program. However, even this solution would be period-based in some sense. Also, given
the several policy measures involved it would not have simplified our task. Thus we
have chosen to use a single factor which we call current policy period. It represents a
partitioning of calendar time based on periods of major policy changes linked to gender
equality and to family dissolution.
For Sweden, we distinguish between three periods. The first period goes from the
mid-1960s to 1973. This was a period of intensive public debate on gender equality, a
time of consensus building concerning the meaning of the concept, with outcomes that
strongly influenced subsequent policies and later changes in traditional gender relations
(Baude 1992). In the second period (from 1974 to the middle of 1983), a range of policy
reforms reflected an increasing influence of the idea of gender equality on policy-
making. Men’s role as parents was recognized in the same way as women’s through the
parental-leave program, but the leave provided was relatively short (6-9 months). The
divorce-law reform aimed at a clean break between the spouses by allowing a quick and
easy divorce procedure but no spousal alimony after divorce. In these years the
emphasis was mostly on strengthening women’s economic provider role as one aspect ofDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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gender equality. Between mid-1983 and 1993 (our third period), the attention turned
towards men. Policies aimed at increasing men’s involvement in parenting as the second
main component of gender equality. For example, a reform in mid-1983 introduced joint
custody as a general rule for children after the parents’ separation. In 1989, the parental
leave was extended to 12 months. The longer leave provides better opportunities for
men to strengthen their relations with their children by taking out parental leave after the
end of the breastfeeding period. Thus the Swedish policy environment has not only been
”women-friendly” (Hernes 1987) but also has facilitated the transformation of the
traditional male gender-role even though the changes in men’s behavior have been
rather limited (Ruggie 1988, Lewis 1992).
For Hungary, our policy variable is based also on three periods but they mark much
less radical policy changes than in Sweden, at least for gender relations. In the first
period (from the mid-1960s to 1981), a long child-care leave (2 years) with a job-
guarantee was introduced for mothers in Hungary (in 1967) as a recognition of women’s
double role as mothers and workers in policy-making. Women’s economic provider role
was also emphasized in the two relatively liberal divorce laws from that time (the first
from 1952 and the second from 1974 (Note 3) that greatly limited the possibility of
spousal alimony after divorce since both women and men were expected to be gainfully
employed. In the second period (from 1982 to mid-1987) fathers’ right to use parental
leave on a par with the mothers was introduced (in 1982), but only for children above
age one. This rule was far from promoting Swedish-type equal parenting as it was not
backed up with a policy  discourse which would have encouraged men’s active
participation in parenting. The third period (from mid-1987 to 1993) started with major
changes in family law. Divorce procedures became more complicated and took longer
because a compulsory pre-divorce court hearing was introduced. Unmarried fathers
could get joint custody if they lived with their children’s mother. The latter is, again, a
rule which strengthened men’s role as fathers. However, the lack of supportive policy
discourse suggests that policy makers had no sincere intention to change traditional
gender relations in Hungary (or in other Central and East European countries),
notwithstanding that women’s labor-force participation on conditions similar to men’s
was seen as the precondition of gender equality during the forty years of state socialism
(Watson 1993).
Our next central covariate is a measure of gender relations in the union. We
constructed this factor somewhat differently in the two countries because of differences
in the data. The Swedish survey provides information on whether the father took any
parental leave with the first child (Note 4). This gives us a clue both to the relations
between the partners and to the father’s involvement in parenting. In unions based on
traditional gender relations, men do not take parental leave regardless of the societal
expectations around the modern paternal role. In other relationships where the idea ofDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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gender equality is accepted by the partners, men tend to take parental leave both
because they wish to spend more time with their children and also to take their share of
parenting responsibilities and thus help the mothers. We do not distinguish according to
the length of the leave taken by the father, as previous studies have shown that mothers
are quite unwilling to let their partner use more than a small part of the parental leave
(Haas 1992, Sundström and Duvander 1999). Thus father’s use of parental leave
functions as a signal of whether he is prone to share family responsibilities with the
mother or not, which can influence union stability.
For Hungary, we apply a gender-role-attitude variable. It is an index based on
several questions regarding relationship and career. (For details, see Table H.5 in
Appendix A.) Also, we use the information on the respondent’s attitude to parenthood
provided in the data. These indirect measures should be more useful than information on
paternal leave could have been, since Hungarian men hardly ever take such leave even
when they have the opportunity (S. Molnár 1992). Such attitude variables may,
however, be somewhat problematic as respondents might have adjusted their attitudes to
their previous behavior (in a kind of ”post-hoc rationalization”). Since there is no
additional information on gender relations in the data for Hungary, we apply these
attitude measures, but we shall be cautious in our interpretation of the findings.
As women’s and men’s equal responsibility for both paid work and family work
has been part of the everyday discourse (of both policy discussions and public debate) in
Sweden since the 1960s (Sainsbury 1996), whereas there was no real effort to challenge
traditional gender relations in the family in Hungary (Szalai 1991), we expect to find a
stronger effect of changing gender relations on family stability in Sweden than in
Hungary (Note 5). This should be the case not only for our societal-level variable but
also for our family-level factor as traditional gender relations have changed very little
within the family in Hungary while Swedish women expect their partners to take more
responsibility for domestic duties. (For evidence of the latter see (SCB 1982, Roman
1999).)
5.2 Labor-force attachment
In order to test our second hypothesis on gender differences in the effects of the
partners’ characteristics regarding labor-force attachment on family disruption, we use
two factors, one to estimate the effect of schooling and the other for labor-market
strategies.
We apply current educational attainment to measure differences in individuals’
human capital which are likely to influence parenting and employment strategies but
also other skills that may be important in a partnership. Our variable refers to the levelDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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of schooling the respondent had attained up to any month after the first birth. This is a
multifaceted factor in union-disruption risks. Since improved education is likely to lead
to a higher income, we expect men with higher education to be considered as more
attractive partners and therefore to have stabler families. Also, highly educated men turn
out to share childrearing responsibilities (Näsman 1992, McFarlane et al. 2000) and
household tasks (Shelton and John 1996) with their partners more often than less
educated men. This should make them even more desirable as partners in a union.
For women, the reverse relationship may obtain. On the one hand, the higher salary
of highly educated women increases their attraction value on the partnership market too
(Oppenheimer 1994). On the other hand, it also provides them with greater economic
independence from their partners. Thus they may be more likely to leave a less
satisfactory relationship than other women (see Hobson 1990), especially as they
probably also are more certain about their abilities to live as single parents than less
educated mothers are. Furthermore, highly educated women more often pursue gender
equality in the division of domestic tasks (Presser 1994, Ahrne and Roman 1997) and
probably are less likely to accept it if their partners fail to share the responsibilities of
home life. On the other hand, one could also argue that given their higher salaries highly
educated women can purchase domestic services more easily in the market (in the form
of hiring domestic help) and thus need much less help from their partners than less
educated women. In Sweden and Hungary such a solution was, however, rather atypical
even among women with higher income in the period we study. Another aspect of
higher education is that it can improve individual skills to find a good partner and to
solve conflicts. This in turn would strengthen union stability.
Thus, while the dissolution risk is likely to decrease when a man’s educational
level improves, we are uncertain about whether disruption risks increase or decrease
with improving educational attainment for women when we take all these various items
together. Only an empirical analysis can provide us with answers as to how these issues
balance against each other in Sweden and Hungary.
To represent labor-market strategies, we use a measure called current employment
status, which shows the respondent’s labor-market attachment in any months after the
first birth. Alternatively, we could have measured previous work experience. However,
such a measure would be less informative than current employment status since women,
even mothers, of working ages normally are in gainful employment in Sweden and
Hungary. In such a context our measure seems to be a sounder choice as it also informs
us about how much time our female respondents may have for their partner, for
children, and for domestic tasks, given the constraints of working hours. Unfortunately,
being on parental leave was not recorded as a separate category for Hungary but as a
continuation of the respondents’ previous employment status.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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As mothers are still the main carer for children, parenting probably has a stronger
influence on their work strategies than that of fathers. Furthermore, doing part-time
rather than full-time work is likely to have different implications for women than for
men because of their differing family roles and particularly their differing labor market
roles. For men, the rule is full-time employment in industrialized countries. By contrast,
because women are expected to give priority to family responsibilities, they are allowed
to follow a wider range of work strategies, often strongly related to the age of their
children. Giving priority to labor market roles over family obligations is considered
”normal” for men, but much less so for women. This is very much the case in Sweden
(see e.g. Lundén Jacoby and Näsman 1989, Ahrne and Roman 1997). Thus we expect to
find differences between women’s and men’s risk patterns for employment status for
family dissolution there. In Hungary, by contrast, opportunities for part-time work were
extremely limited during our period of observation. (Only about 3 per cent of all jobs
were part-time jobs, Frey 1993.) Consequently, full-time employment has been the rule
for both women and men. Thus gender differences are less likely to show up in the
pattern of dissolution risks by employment status for Hungary than for Sweden.
5.3 Analytic model
The analytic model we use to test our two main hypotheses includes then four
explanatory variables, i.e. current policy period, gender relations in the union, current
educational attainment, and current employment status. These are time-varying
covariates with the exception of the ‘gender relations in the union’ measure, which is a
fixed factor. The model also includes factors that are not of main interest to us but that
have been found to greatly influence family disruption in previous studies, or that may
otherwise reasonably be assumed to affect union dissolution (see Appendix A). We
divide these control variables into the following groups:
1. Individual characteristics: Some of these refers to the respondents’ childhood
family experiences (composition of family of origin, number of siblings), others relate
to features such as the respondents’ own birth cohort and own religiosity.
2. Maturity at family formation: This group of factors is linked to the respondents’
maturity as an individual (age at first birth grouped according to educational level at
first birth) and as a member of a couple at the time when the relationship became a
parental union. (The latter is measured by taking into account the interval in months
between (i) the start of the first parental union and (ii) the first birth. We call this factor
”first-birth interval”.)
3. Characteristics specific to the parental-union: These factors contain important
further information on the relationship, namely a representation of the order of the unionDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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in which the first birth occurs (called ”first-birth union order”), the marital status, the
number of children in the household, and the current age of the youngest child.
4. Business-cycle variations: These are measured with country-specific factors
(current unemployment rate for Sweden, changes in consumer price index for Hungary).
As our time variable we use the age of the first child (i.e. union duration since first
birth). Our choice is based on the assumption that the birth of the first child radically
changes the nature of a relationship. Individuals who are parents make calculations in
their decisions on whether or not to dissolve their unions that are different from those of
childless couples. Parenting tasks also change as the child grows older, as do parents’
perceptions on how harmful family disruption is to children. These in turn influence
parents’ propensity to dissolve their families. We have taken these changes into account
in the definition of categories of the time variable. We measure the age of the first child
in months, but our age-categories are defined in years (see Section 4 for details) as this
is easier to understand.
We use a stepwise approach for the model fitting. In a first step we include only
individual characteristics. Next we add the group of covariates that represent maturity at
family formation. Then we include the rest of the control variables. This stepwise
introduction of factors into the model corresponds to the sequence in which they appear
in the respondents’ life. This in turn determines their causal proximity to the current life
situation of the respondents (see Figure 1). This procedure will also help us to see
whether the inclusion of a factor at a later stage in this process influences the estimated
effect of an earlier factor. When it does, the indirect effect of the early factor which
works via the later factor disappears when we include the latter, and we can see more
clearly the direct effect of the earlier factor. This allows us to exclude control variables
that do not have a significant direct effect on first parental union dissolution. In our last
step we keep the control variables that have proved to be important for the current
analysis, and include our explanatory variables in the model.
In the present part of our account we discuss only the main results of our final
model. (See Appendix B for details on the stepwise model fitting in our multivariate
analysis.)Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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6. Findings and discussion
6.1 Sweden
6.1.1 Gender relations
As we see for our societal-level variable (Table S; for the full model see Table S.II in
Appendix B), public policies, measured as current policy period in our analysis, appear
to influence family disruption. The effect is stronger in the male sample, in spite of its
much smaller size as compared to the female sample. In both samples, however, the
patterns of dissolution risks across policy periods are much alike.
The risk of disrupting a first parental union hardly changed over our first two
periods (1965-1973, and 1974-middle of 1983), notwithstanding the large increase in
female labor force participation which took place at that time in Sweden (Sundström
1987) and notwithstanding the introduction of one of the most liberal divorce laws of
the world (in effect since 1974). Couples with children were apparently much less
affected by these changes than childless couples (Note 6) were, at least when it comes to
long-term effects. In the third period (July 1983-1993) however, the risk of family
dissolution rose significantly among families with children, and we notice it particularly
in the male sample. In this period, policy emphasis lay on increasing men’s involvement
in parenting and joint custody for children after family break-up was introduced as a
main rule. Perhaps as this rule gave both parents a better chance to remain active parents
even if the children do not live in their households permanently after family dissolution,
parents felt less obliged to stay in a union which they found unsatisfactory. In this sense,
the joint custody reform may have reduced family stability. Yet, the fear of (oneself or
the other parent) losing contact with the children is not a good basis for keeping a
relationship intact as it may create an atmosphere in the family which is more harmful
than a break-up for the children and also for the parents. Moreover, previous research
has shown that a ”good divorce” may actually be better for the children than living in an
intact family with a lot of tensions between the parents (see e.g. Amato et al. 1995,
Gähler 1998b, Jekielek 1998, Morrison and Coiro 1999). An alternative explanation for
the increase of disruption risks in the third policy period as compared to the previous
periods points to women’s rising expectations of their partner sharing family
responsibilities (see Nordenstam 1985, Roman 1999) and the gap between such
expectations and men’s actual involvement in domestic tasks (Nermo 1994).
Looking at  gender relations  in the union  (measured through the fathers’
involvement in childrearing) we notice that they greatly affect family stability in
Sweden, and significantly so in the female sample. The patterns of disruption risks are
very similar in both samples. If the father took some parental leave with the first child,Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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the risk of union dissolution is lower than otherwise. This suggests that both partners’
engagement in economic and care responsibilities can strengthen their relationship,
possibly because the sources of potential conflicts are reduced in such unions.
Alternatively, this risk pattern may show a selection effect as men who take parental
leave are likely to be more family-oriented than other fathers and thus may also have
stabler unions.
We have also tested for possible interaction effects between current policy period
and gender relations in the union. The results are not significant in the male sample (and
are not presented here), again probably because of its smaller sample size and
correspondingly greater random variation. In the female sample, the results are
significant at the 6 per cent level and the pattern is quite interesting (Figure 2S). Before
the early 1980s, the risk of family disruption in unions where the father took parental
leave with the first child, was about half that of other unions. During the 1980s and early
1990s, however, the risk of family dissolution increased for all unions, and more so in
partnerships where the father used parental leave. Their disruption risk was still well
below that of unions where men did not engage in such active parenting. How can we
interpret this pattern?
The very low dissolution risk for active fathers before the early 1980s may reveal a
selection effect. Men who took parental leave at that time may have been more highly
family-oriented than others and more so then than later on when it became more
common for fathers to take some parental leave.  However, this has not been
accompanied by a comprehensive change of attitude among men in terms of them
sharing domestic tasks more equally with their female partner (see Nermo 1994),
notwithstanding that men in other countries are even less engaged in family work than
Swedish men are (Flood and Klevmarken 1990). Swedish women’s expectations on the
more equal distribution of unpaid domestic work have increased in the 1980s and 1990s
(Nordenstam 1985, Roman 1999) given their experiences of gainful employment and
the Swedish policy discourse on gender equality. Men’s failure to meet these
expectations then resulted in reduced family stability for all unions. Men’s engagement
in active parenting still had some stabilizing effect. As we do not have information in
the data sets on the division of household work (Note 7), our explanation cannot be
tested fully but remains somewhat speculative. In any case, these findings (i.e. both the
results of the main effect model and the interaction term) suggest that changing gender
relations have influenced family stability in Sweden.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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6.1.2 Combining parenthood and employment
As dual-earner families became prevalent in Sweden, the combination of parenting and
paid work became an important aspect of parents’ family stability. Our analysis shows
that factors related to mothers’ labor-market attachment influence family disruption
risks significantly but this is not the case for fathers (Table S). This is in line with our
expectations, given that women still have a larger share of parenting responsibilities
than men do.
Parents’ current educational attainment proved to be rather important for family
stability. Although mother’s education has a stronger effect than does father’s education,
the patterns of dissolution risks are very similar. Those who have the lowest educational
level have the highest risk of family disruption. There are no significant differences in
the disruption risks between the various levels of those with more than compulsory
education. This suggests a selection effect for those with the least education, but can
also refer to their weaker labor market situation and lower incomes. These in turn can
create serious conflicts between the partners in the relationship, who may also have less
skills to solve them. In any case, we do not find important differences in effects of
mother’s versus father’s education on the risk of family disruption in Sweden.
Current employment status also has a strong impact on family disruption risk.
Compared to mothers employed full time, those who are students have a higher risk of
disruption, while those who are employed part-time or on parental leave or not
employed have the lowest risks. Men’s employment has nearly opposite effects, with
higher risks of dissolution for fathers who are employed part time or unemployed (but
not for those on parental leave which is included in the ”other non-employed” category).
Male students do not have a higher disruption risk than do full-time employed fathers.
These results taken together indicate that couples with a more traditional division of
labor are less likely than couples in which the man’s and woman’s employment is
similar or the couple has reversed traditional roles to end their first parental union. This
is linked to societal expectations for men to be ”good providers” and for women to take
the lion’s share in childrearing and household tasks in Sweden too (Björnberg 1992).
Hence, the male gender role seems to change very slowly, while great changes in the
female gender role in terms of labor-force participation are accepted as long as gender
relations in the family concerning the division of responsibilities for domestic tasks are
hardly affected.
We have also tested for interaction effects between our two labor-force-attachment
factors. The effect was not significant in the male sample, and even in the female sample
it was significant only at 12 per cent, but the pattern is interesting nevertheless. As we
see in Figure 3S, the least stable families are those of mothers with compulsory
education who work or study full time, and of students with higher educational
attainment. For all other work categories (except ”other non-employed” women), theDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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least educated mothers have the higher risk of union disruption. Hence, being a student
has a negative impact on family stability independently of educational level (Note 8),
but full-time work does not automatically lead to reduced union stability for mothers
who have more than compulsory education. This pattern is in line with findings of
Swedish time-budget studies showing that the partners of more highly educated women
are more likely to share domestic duties than is the case for women with compulsory
education (Nermo 1994).  Based on such findings and on our own results we may
speculate that in families where parents share both economic and domestic
responsibilities, changing gender relations would not have as detrimental effect on union
stability as in families where only the woman follows the new gender behavioral pattern
while her partner fails to change.
In addition, we tested for interactions with our variables measuring gender relations
at the societal level and at the family level respectively. None of these interaction terms
were found to be significant in the male sample. In the female sample, we found that
women’s education interacted with policy period and paternal leave-taking in its effects
on the disruption risk (significant at the 5 per cent level).
Figure 4S shows that mothers with the least education had the highest risk of family
disruption in all three policy periods. However, the variation of dissolution risks over
time is rather different for them than the pattern we see for mothers with more than
compulsory education. Family instability decreased somewhat for less educated women
between our first and second period, but it increased strongly thereafter. In contrast to
this pattern, the risk of union disruption nearly doubled for mothers with more than
compulsory education from the first to the second period, but it hardly changed in the
decade from 1983 to 1993.
Given that family instability did not increase for less educated mothers in the
second policy period as compared to the earlier period, but it did for mothers with some
education, the explanation of the increased disruption risk for the latter group is not so
likely to be found in the introduction of no-fault divorce law, for there is no reason why
the outcomes would be so different for these two educational groups. Instead we offer
an interpretation based on the notion that gender ideas spread like an innovation
process. We speculate that the increased risk for the more educated mothers may have
depended on their changed perceptions of a fair division of domestic tasks. They may
have wanted their partners to take more responsibility in family work than the partners
would have according to traditional gender relations. They may also have been less
tolerant towards the partners’ failure to meet their higher expectations than women with
the least education were initially. We suppose that in the third period similar ideas had
spread to less educated mothers too. The joint-custody rule established in the third
period may have contributed additionally to the increase of disruption risk specifically
for women with the least education. For more educated women, their partners may haveDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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been more likely to remain part of their children’s life after family break-up (as has been
shown for the US context (Stephens 1996) even before the introduction of the joint-
custody rule. For less educated mothers this may not have been the case before the mid-
1980s, thus the parents in those families may have been more likely to stay together ”for
the sake of the children”. Such sacrifice became unnecessary for them when parents
retained joint custody for their children after family dissolution as the general rule.
 The interesting pattern seen for Figure 5S reveals a further aspect of the link
between family-level gender relations and union stability. We notice that the risk of
union disruption is lower for women at all educational levels when the father took
parental leave with the first child than otherwise. Women with the lowest and the
highest education whose partner did not take parental leave have the least stable families
among all mothers. The risk of union disruption is twice as high for highly educated
mothers whose partner proved to be a less engaged parent as for those whose partner
took parental leave. The difference in disruption risks between those with a more caring
partner and those with a less caring partner is much lower for women with less than
higher education. This indicates that women with post-gymnasium education are less
likely than other mothers to accept the failure of their partner to adjust to modern gender
roles and not to engage in active parenting.
In sum, our findings for Sweden point to the importance of gender relations in
family stability as well as to changes in gender perceptions over time. In addition, the
disruption-risk patterns by employment status revealed substantial gender differences in




In contrast to the Swedish findings, the overall impact of public policies, measured
through current policy period, on family disruption risks in Hungary is not significant
(Table H; for the full model see Table H.II in Appendix B). This was what we expected,
since the Hungarian policy discourse around gender equality and the changes in relevant
policies were less aimed at changing gender relations in the family than it was the case
in Sweden. The disruption-risk patterns are alike in the female and male samples, with
much higher risk in the early and mid-1980s than in the previous period. The difference
is not significant in the male sample, again probably because of its much smaller sample
size. In the third period, the risk of family break-up decreased somewhat but the change
was not significant in either sample.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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The higher disruption risk for the second period than in the first period suggests
that men might have felt having a better bargaining position to keep contact with their
children even after a divorce due to the new rules to strengthen their role as fathers. This
may have made them more likely to accept an end of their union if they found it
unsatisfactory. Alternatively, the higher disruption risk was connected to increasing
individualism in the Hungarian population as Hungary became more open to ”Western
influences” than other Central and East European countries, especially in the 1980s. As
for the somewhat lower although not significantly different divorce risk in the third
period, it seems that the more restrictive divorce law from 1987 could not strengthen
family stability in the long run, possibly because of the dramatic changes of the political
and economic system after 1989. The collapse of state socialism and the rapidly
increasing unemployment level generated tensions which a large number of individuals
and families had difficulties to cope with. This could counteract the more restrictive
divorce law.
Not surprisingly, the impact of gender relations at the family level on union
stability in Hungary is not significant either, quite unlike our findings for Sweden. For
both gender-role attitude and attitude to parenthood, the disruption risk patterns are
rather similar in both samples, and the risk profiles are in line with our expectations. For
the former factor we find that those with a traditional gender-role attitude have lower
risk of union dissolution  than parents with egalitarian or intermediate gender-role
attitudes. For the latter factor we see that the risk of family disruption is higher for self-
centered parents than for others.
The differences between the dissolution risks for the different categories are not
significant for either of these factors. For the attitude-to-parenthood variable this might
be explained by union dissolution being a widely accepted behavior in the Hungarian
society, and parents whose main principle is their children’s best interest (i.e. our
”child-centered” category) are no exception. Perhaps some of those among them who
dissolved their union might even argue that they have done so because of their children.
Thus a given attitude to parenthood is less likely to function as an impediment of
divorce or separation. As for the other factor, the lack of significant differences in
dissolution risks among parents with different gender-role attitudes can be related to the
fact that most Hungarian families follow the traditional gender division of labor in the
home in spite of women’s full-time employment. Thus the ”comparison referents” (see
Section 2.1) could hardly have changed women’s perceptions on the fair share of
domestic tasks in Hungary. Also, the Swedish-type intensive public (and policy) debate
on the new male gender role as linked to the idea of gender equality was missing in
Hungary as we have noted before. Hence, the differences between our three types of
gender-role attitudes remained relatively limited.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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The lack of significant influence of these factors (i.e. attitude to parenthood and
gender-role attitude) on family disruption in Hungary can also be connected to the fact
that our gender-relation variables are attitude measures, while for Sweden we had a
measure based on actual behavior (father’s participation in active parenting). As attitude
and behavior do not always coincide, these measures may have been less adequate for
the dimension we try to tap, though they were the best we could obtain from the
Hungarian data. However, this measurement problem is unlikely to be of major
importance as the effect coefficients are indeed meaningful in the Hungarian context.
We tested also for interaction effects between our gender-relations variables (i.e.
between gender-role attitude and attitude to parenthood, and these separately with
current policy period). None of these interaction terms were significant or interesting in
either sample.
6.2.2 Combining parenthood and employment
While the gender-relations factors had no significant impact on parents’ family stability
in Hungary, labor-market behavior appears to have stronger effect (Table H). Current
educational attainment seems to be somewhat less important for union stability in
Hungary than it is for Swedish parents, but effects of women’s and men’s education are
similar. As is true in Sweden, those with low level of education have higher risk of
family disruption than individuals with more schooling. However, the threshold for
effects of men’s and women’s education differs in Hungary. Hungarian fathers with
more than compulsory education have much lower risk of family disruption than the
least educated men, while mothers have a reduced dissolution risk only at a gymnasium
and higher level of schooling. The gender-specific thresholds may be connected to some
gender-segregation in the labor market, and the disruption risk patterns relate to the
relatively poorer economic situation of those with low education. It is thus a gender
effect that for women more schooling was required for a job with decent earnings than
for men for whom any education above the compulsory level could lead to a relatively
good income. As individuals with the least education had fewer resources, their housing
conditions were relatively poorer. This meant that they more often had to share a home
with the parents of their spouse or with their own parents, which is likely to create
tensions. Alternatively, the higher disruption risk for those with less schooling can be
explained by their lower skills in solving conflicts that arise in the relationship.
The relatively strong influence of current employment status on family dissolution
in Hungary is rather surprising, as the vast majority of women and men alike were
employed full time during state socialism. However, we only find significantly different
disruption risks when women are outside of the labor market (except for housewives)Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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and when men work less than full time. The lack of significant differences in disruption
risks between housewives and employed women who work full time or part time can be
related to the limited influence of women’s work strategies on gender relations within
the family, especially regarding the persistent traditional division of domestic tasks in
Hungary, unlike in Sweden. In addition, Hungarian women’s student status does not
increase the risk of disruption, but instead reduces it, contrary to the Swedish case. On
the other hand, Hungarian men who study have a high risk of union disruption but the
effect is not significant. In any case, students represent a very small fraction of parents
in Hungary as childbearing was usually postponed until one finished education and had
a job. Similarly to the findings for Sweden, father’s part-time employment (and
unemployment) greatly increases the risk of family break-up. As gender arrangements in
the family remained traditional in Hungary, men’s role as the main economic provider
of the family is even more emphasized there than in Sweden.
We also tested for interaction effects between the labor-market attachment factors,
and for these with each of the factors of gender relations. None of these interaction
terms proved to be significant or interesting in either the female or the male sample.
To sum up our findings for Hungary, traditional gender relations within the family
have hardly changed there, unlike in Sweden, notwithstanding the societal acceptance of
women’s full-time employment (also for mothers). Nevertheless, we found gender-
specific disruption risk patterns for parents’ labor-market behavior in Hungary similarly
to the results for Sweden.
7. Concluding remarks
As the male-breadwinner model has increasingly been challenged (or even replaced) by
a dual-earner family model in industrialized countries in the last decades of the 20
th
century, male-female relationships within the family operate in a new terrain. While
women’s economic dependence on their spouses was undoubtedly an important reason
of family stability in previous times, the new conditions under which families function
nowadays have changed the nature of the relationship between women and men
(Oppenheimer 1994). Yet increasingly overlapping gender roles in the labor market do
not automatically result in similar changes in the home. The gap between gender roles in
the public and private spheres can then become a source of family instability, which can
be overcome by a more equal share of domestic responsibilities between women and
men. In this study, we have found evidence for such a development in Sweden. While
the policy discourse and the actual policies around equal participation in work and
family life have encouraged this change, there is still a gap between ideology and
practice.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Hungary remained a ”traditional society” in many ways and preserved a traditional
gender hierarchy during state socialism in spite of the dominant position of a (full-time)
dual-earner family model for over 40 years. In this country gender relations seem to be
of much less importance for family stability than other factors. Perhaps economic
constrains have been more severe for shaping family decisions in Hungary than in
Sweden. In addition, there may be a threshold in individual awareness of the need to
change traditional gender-behavior patterns also at the family level, and this threshold
may not yet have been reached in Hungary. Such awareness has started to grow in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the transition period which followed the
collapse of state socialism, while the conditions under which women combine paid work
and family life have become harder (Watson 1993). A new wave of family surveys in
the early 21
st century may then provide us with data that help us further clarify the
relationship between changing gender relations and family stability.
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Notes
1.   Both the death of a child and having the partner’s child from a previous relationship
in the household can create tensions in the family which may lead to union
dissolution. Such cases are not suitable for a study of the effect of changing gender
relations on family stability.
2.   In a preliminary analysis we distinguished also between the categories ‘years of
school start’ (up to age 8) and ‘mid-school-age years’ (up to age 12). We decided to
combine them into a single category (i.e. ‘early and middle school-age years’) based
on their very similar disruption intensities.
3.   We have seen in a previous analysis that the further liberalization of the Hungarian
divorce legislation (in effect from 1974) had no significant long-term effect on
family stability among families with children (Oláh 2000).
4.   Swedish fathers’ eligibility for parental leave was limited before 1974, and under
certain circumstances even later on. Thus we also include a category called ‘other’
for this variable.
5.   One might think that Hungary being a more traditional society the effect of non-
traditional gender attitudes should be stronger than in Sweden based on the greater
selectivity of that group. However, the lack of change in the home sphere in Hungary
in terms of labor division suggests that non-traditional attitudes were not
accompanied by less traditional everyday practices. Thus the effect of attitudes were
probably relatively limited. Therefore we expect to find stronger impact of changing
gender relations in Sweden  than in Hungary.
6.   Andersson’s (1997) annual index of divorce-risk level for Sweden rose dramatically
in the 1970s and 1980s. His study included only married couples, while we also
include non-marital unions as we would have expected a bandwagon or contagion
effect for cohabiting couples in times of radically increasing divorce indices. Yet as
we found also in a previous analysis (Oláh forthcoming), the risks of family
dissolution among families with children changed very little in the period before
1983 both for non-marital and for marital unions (and independently of whether a
marriage started as a cohabiting relationship or not).
7.   The Swedish questionnaire did not address these issues. For Hungary, there is some
information about the share of domestic work, but only for respondents who were
living in a relationship at the time of the interview, and this is insufficient for our
purposes. We do not have data on the gender division of labor in previous unions for
Hungary either.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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8.   Sweden has a highly developed system of adult-education comprising all levels of
education from primary to tertiary levels.
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introduced in 1947 introduced in 1938
universal benefit until the 1970s employment in state sector required;
1990-1995: universal benefit; means-tested from
1996
paid to the mother paid to the father (or to the mother if ineligible
father)
one-child families eligible from the start originally for large families; from 1983 also one-
child families eligible
higher allowance for the third child (and
additional children)
higher allowance for single parents,  for those with
disabled children, and for large families
2, Housing-related
benefit
introduced in the mid-1930s, for large families introduced in the 1970s
means-tested housing allowance "baby bonus" - part of the bank loan for young
couples building or buying a dwelling transformed
into a benefit if they had one child within three
years or two children within six years
one-child families eligible since 1958 only couples below age 35 eligible
3, Maternity/
parental benefit
1962: six months maternity leave with 65%
income replacement
1967: child-care leave until the child becomes 2.5
years old; extended to the third birthday of the child
in 1969. Flat-rate child-care allowance "GYES"
(about 40% of the average earnings of a young
female unskilled worker)
gradually extended parental leave since 1974
with income-related benefit (90% replacement
level until the mid-1990s)
only mothers eligible at first; since 1982 also
fathers after the first birthday of the child
1974: 6 months parental leave 1985: income-related child-care pay "GYED" (75%
replacement level); only mothers eligible with
children below age one
1975: 7 months parental leave 1986: "GYED" extended by half year; fathers
eligible after the child's first birthday
1978: 8 months parental leave, plus one
month with flat-rate benefit
1987: "GYED" extended until the second birthday of
the child
1980: 9 months parental leave, plus three
months with flat-rate benefit;   also 10 "daddy
days" with 90% income replacement
"GYES" paid by the number of children below age
three cared for at home; "GYED" is independent of
the number of children
1989: 12 months parental leave, plus three
months with flat-rate benefit
1996: "GYED" abolished, "GYES" means-tested
1995: one month leave reserved for the father
and another for the mother with 90% income
replacement, but only 80% for the other 10
months leave
1996: 75% replacement level




1998: 80% replacement level 3, Maternity/
parental benefit
leave on a full-time or part-time basis, or
spread out over the years up to the child’s
eighth birthday
leave on full-time basis; since 1982 ”GYES” on half-
time basis in combination with part-time work
taxable benefit with job-guarantee and
pension-entitlement
both benefits with job-guarantee and pension
entitlement; only ”GYED” taxable from 1988 when
individual income tax was introduced
Social services:
1, public childcare since the 1960s, rapid expansion after the
mid-1970s
since the early state-socialist period
run by municipalities run by municipalities and by big companies
financed mainly by government subsidies, but
also by parents' fees based on the family
income
financed mainly by state subsidies, but also by
parents' fees based on the family income
employed parents and students with pre-
school children (age 1.5-7years) eligible
employed parents and students with children of age
0.6-6 years eligible
2, school lunch
free or low fee for school-lunch for pupils in
primary school
school lunch for pupils in primary school and
secondary education; fees based on the family
incomeDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Table B: Divorce legislation and child custody rules in Sweden and Hungary
Sweden Hungary
Divorce legislation: 1915: divorce on fault grounds;
also some no-fault grounds acknowledged
1952: no-fault divorce introduced; a
marriage could be dissolved if it had
broken down irretrievably
1974: all fault grounds eliminated; no-fault divorce only 1974: more liberal law; divorce by mutual
consent
shortened and simplified divorce procedure; a waiting
period of six months required only for couples with minor
children or if the couple disagreed on divorce
1987: more complicated divorce
procedure; compulsory pre-divorce
court-hearing aiming the reconciliation
introduced
spousal alimony almost non-existent spousal alimony legally possible, in
practice nearly non-existent
property divided evenly between the former spouses
independently of its source; only the family home (if
acquired for the couple's joint living) and the household
goods divided evenly at separation from non-marital
cohabiting relationships
property divided evenly between the
former spouses independently of its
source
non-resident parent obliged to pay child-support (relatively
modest amount); if non-payment state-provided
maintenance allowance (requested from the debtor later
on)
non-resident parent obliged to pay child-
support based on income (20% for one
child, 40% for two children, 50% for three
or more children)
Child custody: unmarried mother: sole custody; married parents: joint
custody
unmarried mother: sole custody; married
parents: joint custody
joint custody also on request of parents in non-marital
consensual union through joint application to the court
(since 1977) or to the local tax authority if both parents and
the child Swedish citizens (since 1983)
joint custody also on request of the
father in non-marital consensual union
through application to the court (since
1987), mother's consent required
mid-1983: divorced/separated parents retain joint custody
unless one of them files for its annulment
October 1998: court can decide on continued joint custody
according to the child's best interest even if one parent
disagreesDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Figure 1:  Causality sequence diagramDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Table S:  Relative risks of dissolution of the first parental union for Swedish women
and men. Main results from the final model.
Standardized for childhood family, age at first birth (conditional on education at first birth), first-birth interval, first-birth union order,
marital status, current age of the youngest child, and age of the first child
#.
women men
current policy period: (p = 0.091) (p = 0.014)
Jan. 1964 - Dec. 1973 0.92 0.91
Jan. 1974 - June 1983 1 1
July 1983 - June 1993 1.30** 1.74***




current educational attainment: (p = 0.003) (p = 0.284)
compulsory education 1 1




¤: (p = 0.000) (p = 0.116)
full-time employed 1 1
long part-time employed 0.76* 1.81
short part-time employed 0.41*** 3.26*
on parental leave 0.45***
own household work 0.60***
unemployed 0.87 3.10**
student 1.51* 1.18
other non-employed 0.47*** 0.86
log likelihood -2870.3 -1189.7
no. of independent parameters      33      31
null model log likelihood -3016.6 -1253.8
***  significant at the 1%-level; ** at 5%; * at 10%
Note: For each variable, risks and their significance are given relative to the reference level, indicated by 1 (no decimals). The p-
value of the entire factor is given in the row containing the variable name
#  For the full model, see Table S.II in Appendix B.
¤  The categories ”on parental leave” and ”own household work” for men are included in the ”other non-employed” category.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Figure 2S:  Relative risks of dissolution of the first parental union for Swedish
women, by current policy period and according to whether the father











* Standardized for childhood family, age at first birth (conditional on education at first birth), first-birth interval, first-birth union
order, marital status, current age of the youngest child, current educational attainment, current employment status, and age of
the first child.
Note:  (p = 0.056)
Since men were not eligible for parental leave in the first policy period, we collapsed the first two periods into a single
category. Also, the categories ”no” and ”other” for father’s leave were collapsed into a single category (called ”no”) given
their very similar disruption intensities.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Figure 3S: Relative risks of dissolution of the first parental union for Swedish

















*  Standardized for childhood family, age at first birth (conditional on education at first birth), first-birth interval, first-birth union
order, marital status, current age of the youngest child, father’s use of parental leave, current policy period, and age of the first
child.
Note:  (p = 0.123)
As the disruption intensities for the categories above compulsory education were not significantly different from each other, we have
collapsed them into a single category. For current employment status the category of ”unemployed” was included in the ”other
non-employed” category.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Figure 4S: Relative risks of dissolution of the first parental union for Swedish
















 * Standardized for childhood family, age at first birth (conditional on education at first birth), first-birth interval, first-birth union
order, marital status, current age of the youngest child, father took leave after first birth, current employment status, and age of
the first child.
Note:  (p = 0.032)
Those with an educational level above compulsory education are included in the ”more educated” category.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Figure 5S: Relative risks of dissolution of the first parental union for Swedish
women, by current educational attainment and according to whether the
















*  Standardized for childhood family, age at first birth (conditional on education at first birth), first-birth interval, first-birth union
order, marital status, current age of the youngest child, current policy period, current employment status, and age of the first
child.
Note:  (p = 0.036)
The category ”no” for father’s leave includes also fathers who were not eligible for parental leave.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
http://www.demographic-research.org 69
Table H: Relative risks of dissolution of the first parental union for Hungarian
women and men. Main results from the final model.
Standardized for religiosity, childhood family, age at first birth (conditional on education at first birth), first-birth union order, marital
status, current age of the youngest child, and age of the first child
#.
women men
current policy period: (p = 0.168) (p = 0.490)
Jan. 1964 - Dec. 1981 1 1
Jan. 1982 - June 1987 1.34* 1.41
July 1987 - Dec. 1993 1.22 1.33








current educational attainment: (p = 0.148) (p = 0.317)
compulsory education 1 1




¤: (p = 0.049) (p = 0.223)
full-time employed 1 1
part-time employed 0.75 4.17**
own household work 1.50
unemployed 1.81
student 0.60** 3.62
other non-employed 0.36* 1.53
log likelihood -2716.9 -933.9
no. of independent parameters      28    28
null model log likelihood -2787.4 -964.1
***  significant at the 1%-level, ** at 5%, * at 10%
Note:
For each variable, risks and their significance are given relative to the reference level, indicated by 1 (no decimals).
The p-value of the entire factor is given in the row containing the variable name.
# For the full model, see Table H.II in Appendix B.
¤ For women, the category ”unemployed” is included in the ”other non-employed” category.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Appendix A. Control variables
A.1 Individual characteristics
Our first group of control variables consists of a diversity of individual characteristics.
A factor called childhood family reflects the composition of the family in which the
respondent was brought up. For Sweden, we distinguish between intact families and
various types of non-intact families. For Hungary, we do not have information about the
death of the respondents’ parents, so we distinguish only between intact, divorced, and
other non-intact families. We include this factor into our analysis because there is
convincing evidence of intergenerational transmission of divorce in a large literature
from several countries. These earlier findings show that parental divorce greatly
increases offspring’s family dissolution risks (see McLanahan and Bumpass 1988;
Amato 1996 or Feng et al. 1999 for the US; Kiernan and Cherlin 1999 for the UK;
Diekman and Engelhardt 1995; Diefenbach 1997 for Germany).
A variable called number of siblings counts full and half siblings of the
respondents. Those who are single children or who have one sibling only are probably
often more strongly individualistic than those who come from larger families and may
have different social skills. Everything else equal, the latter group should therefore be
less likely to dissolve their relationships.
A variable called own birth cohort groups individuals born in the same calendar
years. For Sweden we use the data’s single year cohorts: 1949, 1954, 1959, 1964, and
1969 for women and 1949, 1959, and 1964 for men. For Hungary we work with the
following categories: 1951-1952, 1953-1957, 1958-1962, 1963-1967 and 1968-1972 for
women and 1949-1953, 1954-1958, 1959-1963, 1964-1968 and 1969-1973 for men,
based on the categorization of the FFS Standard Country Report for Hungary (Kamarás
1999). As family disruption has become more frequent in recent decades, the attitudes
toward family stability have also changed. Divorce has no great stigma in the perception
of younger cohorts, but it may be more difficult to accept as a part of a ‘normal’ family
career for older cohorts.
A respondent’s religious activity level is linked to their frequency of church
attendance. Those who participate in religious meetings at least once a month are
defined as religiously active. The information we use for this variable relates to the time
of the interview. We recognize that this may be problematic. We assume, however, that
religiosity is relatively constant over a person’s life-time, even if dramatic events can
alter a person’s religious commitment. Given that the countries of our analysis are rather
secularized and that the age-range we look at is limited to young adulthood and early-
middle age, changes in one’s level of religiosity is probably relatively rare among ourDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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respondents. As for the effect of religiosity, it has been shown that religiously active
individuals have more stable families than others (Hoem and Hoem 1992; Finnäs 1996).
A.2 Maturity at family formation
The second group of control variables allows us to estimate the effect on family stability
of different aspects of maturity at family formation. We study the impact of age at first
birth and of first-birth interval as the former represents individual maturity, while the
latter shows the maturity of the couple at the time of first birth.
Our age variable is defined in relative terms given that the grouping takes into
account the respondents’ educational level at first birth but also the fact that men have
their first child at higher ages than women. The construction of the factor age at first
birth is based thus on the reasoning that ”… the effect of a given covariate on behavior
… must depend on its social meaning among a person’s peers and not on its average
meaning in the population as a whole” (Hoem 1996:334). For each educational level we
grouped together ages in approximately 20 per cent intervals (Table S.4; Table H.4).
We have included this factor in our analysis on the basis of findings reported in the
literature from a number of countries. It is a common finding that an early start of family
formation greatly increases the risk of union dissolution (see Morgan and Rindfuss
1985; South and Spitze 1986; Castro Martin and Bumpass 1989 for the US; Berrington
and Diamond 1999 for the UK; Hoem and Hoem 1992; Trussell et al. 1992 for Sweden;
Finnäs 1996 for Finland).
First-birth interval represents the time between the formation of the first parental
union and the first birth. It should pick up how much the partners have matured together
as a couple before they become parents. Previous research has shown that the risk of
family disruption is higher if a couple has the first child in the first year of their union
already, and that the risk decreases greatly if the first birth takes place in the third or a
later year of the union (Hoem 1997).
A.3 Parental-union-specific characteristics
Our third group of control variables includes additional characteristics of the
respondents’ first parental union. First-birth union order informs us about whether the
first child was born in the respondents’ first co-residential relationship or in a higher-
order union. A lot of previous research has shown that disruption risk is higher in
second or later unions. (See e.g. Hoem 1997; Berrington and Diamond 1999.)Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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While the previously presented factors were fixed covariates, the rest of our control
variables are time-varying covariates.  To represent  marital status, we distinguish
between (i) non-marital consensual unions, (ii) “direct” marriages, where the couple
married at the start of their first parental union, and (iii) ”transformed” marriages, in
which the union started as non-marital cohabiting relationship but was transformed into
a marriage by the time the couple’s first child was born or later.  As there is no
distinction in either Sweden or Hungary between children born to married couples and
children of unmarried mothers, we treat in the analysis marriages that were preceded by
cohabitation with the same partner as a singly u nion type after marriage formation
independently of when the marriage occurred (i.e. before or after the first birth). The
importance of marital status for family stability has been shown for a number of
countries.  One has found that the risk of separation is much higher in non-marital
cohabiting relationships than in marriages, and that a marriage preceded by cohabitation
with the same partner has a higher dissolution risk than a direct marriage (see Axinn and
Thornton 1992; Thomson and Colella 1992; Lillard et al. 1995 for the US; Berrington
and Diamond 1999 for the UK; Bennett et al. 1988, Hoem and Hoem 1992 for Sweden;
Finnäs 1996 for Finland).
The number of children in the household gives the actual family size of the
respondents in any month after the first birth. It has not been a decisive factor of union
stability in the US (Waite and Lillard 1991) or Canada (Wu 1995), but previous studies
for Sweden have shown that families with two or three children are significantly more
stable than other families (Hoem and Hoem 1992; Andersson 1995; Andersson 1997).
A variable called current age of the youngest child shows how old the youngest
child is in any month if there is more than one child in the family. Otherwise it informs
us that there is only one child in the household. In that case the age of the child is of
course measured by the time variable and we do not need a second covariate to pick it
up. Previous research has shown that the presence of young children (below age 5 or 6)
strongly reduces the risk of family disruption (see Bracher et al. 1993 for Australia;
Trussell et al. 1992, Andersson 1997 for Sweden).
A.4 Business-cycle variations
Our last group of control variables includes country-specific factors referring to
business-cycle variations. For Sweden, we use the  annual national  current
unemployment rate. For Hungary we use the consumer price index (CPI), since
unemployment did not officially exist during state-socialism and therefore it was not
registered before the late 1980s. Our measure for Hungary is based on the level of
changes in CPI (for food products) from one year to the next as this greatly affectedDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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people’s living standard. We define the categories of these variables lagged by half a
year. Previous research has shown that the divorce rate tends to fall following periods of
economic prosperity and tends to rise after periods of business-cycle downturns (South
1985).
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Table 1: Number of respondents excluded from and included in the analysis of the
disruption of the first parental union in Sweden and Hungary.
Sweden Hungary
Total number of respondents: 4984 5487
1
Cases excluded because of:
no recorded partnership 492 1108
no recorded biological child 1155 558
grew up in a non-Nordic country (for Sweden only) 269 -
below age 20 at interview (for Hungary only) - 20
incomplete union and/or childbearing history (for Hungary only) - 21
single (neither married nor cohabiting) at first birth 223 211
had adopted
2 child and/or partner’s child in the first parental union 94 11
first parental union ended in the month when first birth occurred 5 8
first child died in the first parental union 16 50
Total number of excluded cases: 2254 1987
Total number of cases used: 2730 3500
Number of women included in the analysis: 1869 2430
Number of cases where the first parental union was disrupted: 383 333
Number of cases censored 16 years after the first birth: 360 406
Number of cases censored at the death of the partner in this union: 9 42
Number of cases censored at interview: 1117 1649
Number of men included in the analysis: 861 1070
Number of cases where the first parental union was disrupted: 156 111
Number of cases censored 16 years after the first birth: 210 202
Number of cases censored at the death of the partner in this union: 2 7
Number of cases censored at interview: 493 750
1 The number of respondents for Hungary is larger than it is in the Standard Recode File that can be requested from the
Population Activities Unit in Geneva because only fully completed interviews are included there. In the present study we work
with the original Hungarian FFS files provided by Statistics Hungary.
2 Since there were only one such respondent left in our Swedish working sample plus two respondents in the Hungarian sample,
we have chosen to exclude them instead of to censor them at the adoption date.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Table S.2: Distributions of Swedish respondents at the various levels of fixed
covariates. Parents in their first-birth union.
Women men
# of respondents per cent   # of respondents per cent
own birth cohort:
1949 464 24.8 425 49.3
1954 471 25.2
1959 469 25.1 209 24.3
1964 327 17.5 227 26.4
1969 138 7.4
childhood family:
intact family 1506 80.6 712 82.7
parents divorced 234 12.5 97 11.3
parent died 58 3.1 22 2.5
other non-intact family 71 3.8 30 3.5
number of siblings:
no sibling 141 7.5 67 7.8
one sibling 587 31.4 261 30.3
two siblings 526 28.2 256 29.7
three or more siblings 615 32.9 277 32.2
religious activity level:
active 174 9.3 58 6.7
not active 1695 90.7 803 93.3
first-birth union order:
1 1565 83.7 728 84.6
2 261 14.0 112 13.0
3+ 43 2.3 21 2.4
age at first birth
# (conditional on educational level at first birth):
very young 311 16.6 171 19.9
rather young 478 25.6 196 22.8
medium 421 22.5 213 24.7
rather old 310 16.6 137 15.9
oldest 349 18.7 144 16.7
first-birth interval (in months):
< 8 180 9.6 88 10.2
  8 - 17 362 19.4 169 19.6
18 - 35 546 29.2 243 28.2
36 - 59 405 21.7 214 24.9
60 + 376 20.1 147 17.1
father took leave after first birth:
yes, 3+ months 212 11.3 91 10.6
yes, 1 - 2 months 189 10.1 83 9.6
yes, < 1 month 627 33.6 335 38.9
no 745 39.9 296 34.4
other 96 5.1 56 6.5
total: 1869 100.0 861 100.0
#  See Table S.4 for details.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Table S.3: Exposure time in person-half-months at the various levels of time-varying
covariates and of the time variable for Swedish respondents.
women men
exposure time per cent exposure time per cent
marital status:
non-marital consensual union 109254 29.4 49666 28.0
transformed marriage (cohab. at start) 223256 60.2 111910 63.0
direct marriage 38600 10.4 15972 9.0
no. of children in the household:
one 149052 40.2 71534 40.3
two 168712 45.4 80970 45.6
three or more 53346 14.4 25044 14.1
current age of the youngest child:
< 1 year 40818 11.0 18462 10.4
1 - 2 years 66640 18.0 30190 17.0
3 - 5 years 60254 16.2 28746 16.2
6 + years 54346 14.6 28616 16.1
only one child in the household 149052 40.2 71534 40.3
current educational attainment:
compulsory education 104116 28.1 53832 30.3
lower level vocational school 150458 40.5 65180 36.7
gymnasium 35374 9.5 23710 13.4
post-gymnasium 81162 21.9 34826 19.6
current employment status:
full-time employed 83358 22.5 164734 92.8
long part-time employed 75388 20.3 2118 1.2
short part-time employed 62378 16.8 1418 0.8
on parental leave 75454 20.3 778 0.5
own household work 48692 13.1 342 0.2
unemployed 3076 0.8 1260 0.7
student 10720 2.9 4348 2.4
other non-employed 12044 3.3 2550 1.4
current policy period:
January 1964 - December 1973 18578 5.0 7211 4.1
January 1974 - June 1983 127571 34.4 65404 36.8
July 1983 - June 1993 224961 60.6 104933 59.1
current (national) unemployment rate:
< 2.0 % 113670 30.6 54726 30.8
2.0 - 2.9 % 159544 43.0 76054 42.8
> = 3.0 % 97896 26.4 46768 26.4
age of first child (time variable):
< 1 year 43162 11.7 19940 11.2
  1 - 2 years 75114 20.2 35002 19.7
  3 - 5 years 89162 24.0 40736 23.0
  6 - 7 years 46834 12.6 21554 12.1
  8 - 11 years 71338 19.2 34958 19.7
12 - 15 years 45500 12.3 25358 14.3
total: 371110 100.0 177548 100.0Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Table S.4a: Age at first birth, conditional on educational level at first birth.
Swedish women.
Age age-groups according to education at first birth
compulsory education low vocational school gymnasium post-gymnasium
ages in
years
per cent ages in
years
per cent ages in
years
per cent ages in
years
per cent
very young 15 - 18 19.0 17 - 20 14.9 18 - 21 12.0 21 - 24 19.3
rather young 19 - 20 23.8 21 - 22 28.4 22 - 23 26.1 25 - 26 22.5
medium 21 - 22 23.8 23 - 24 21.6 24 - 26 26.6 27 - 28 20.6
rather old 23 - 24 15.5 25 - 26 17.4 27 - 28 15.0 29 - 30 17.4
oldest 25 + 17.9 27 + 17.7 29 + 20.3 31 + 20.2
Total 499 749 207 414
per cent of
total N (1869)
26.7 40.1 11.1 22.1
Table S.4b: Age at first birth, conditional on educational level at first birth.
Swedish men.
Age age-groups according to education at first birth
compulsory education low vocational school gymnasium post-gymnasium
years per cent years per cent years per cent years per cent
very young 18 - 21 19.3 18 - 22 20.1 20 - 23 20.1 21 - 25 20.0
rather young 22 - 23 21.7 23 - 24 23.0 24 - 25 19.3 26 - 27 22.5
medium 24 - 25 22.2 25 - 26 22.0 26 - 27 29.9 28 - 29 22.6
rather old 26 - 27 16.6 27 - 28 16.3 28 - 29 16.7 30 - 31 13.6
oldest 28 + 20.2 29 + 14.6 30 + 14.0 32 + 17.3
Total 253 339 114 155
per cent of
total N (861)
29.4 39.4 13.2 18.0Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Table H.2: Distributions of Hungarian respondents at the various levels of fixed
covariates. Parents in their first-birth union.
women men
# of respondents per cent   # of respondents per cent
cohort:
women: 1951-52; men: 1949-53 174 7.2 299 27.9
women: 1953-57; men: 1954-58 828 34.0 319 29.8
women: 1958-62; men: 1959-63 639 26.3 258 24.1
women: 1963-67; men: 1964-68 500 20.6 151 14.2
women: 1968-72; men: 1969-73 289 11.9 43 4.0
childhood family:
intact family 2023 83.2 945 88.3
parents divorced 257 10.6 83 7.8
other non-intact family 150 6.2 42 3.9
number of siblings:
no sibling 336 13.8 156 14.6
one sibling 1041 42.8 477 44.6
two siblings 528 21.8 224 20.9
three or more siblings 525 21.6 213 19.9
religious activity level:
active 336 13.8 106 9.9
not active 2094 86.2 964 90.1
first-birth union order:
1 2343 96.4 1018 95.1
2+ 87 3.6 52 4.9
age at first birth
* (conditional on educational level at first birth):
very young 356 14.7 217 20.3
rather young 667 27.4 251 23.5
medium 564 23.2 262 24.5
rather old 446 18.4 178 16.6
oldest 397 16.3 162 15.1
first-birth interval (in months):
< 8 512 21.1 216 20.2
  8 - 17 955 39.3 394 36.8
18 - 35 633 26.0 307 28.7
36 - 59 229 9.4 114 10.7
60 + 101 4.2 39 3.6
attitude to parenthood
*:
child-centered 1754 72.2 774 72.3
self-centered 227 9.3 108 10.1
other 449 18.5 188 17.6
gender-role attitude
*:
egalitarian 589 24.2 302 28.2
intermediate 1684 69.3 721 67.4
traditional 157 6.5 47 4.4
total: 2430 100.0 1070 100.0
* See Tables H.4 and H.5 for details.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Table H.3: Exposure time in person-half-months at the various levels of time-varying
covariates and of the time variable for Hungarian respondents.
women men
exposure time per cent exposure time per cent
marital status:
non-marital consensual union 7108 1.3 1716 0.7
transformed marriage (cohab. at start) 46882 8.9 25444 10.5
direct marriage 474932 89.8 214520 88.8
no. of children in the household:
one 235550 44.5 111600 46.2
two 247952 46.9 111696 46.2
three or more 45420 8.6 18384 7.6
current age of the youngest child:
< 1 year 44974 8.5 19882 8.2
1 - 2 years 75740 14.3 33976 14.1
3 - 5 years 81174 15.4 36474 15.1
6 + years 91484 17.3 39748 16.4
only one child in the household 235550 44.5 111600 46.2
current educational attainment:
compulsory education 157572 29.8 38238 15.8
lower level vocational school 120280 22.8 108298 44.8
gymnasium 187438 35.4 66040 27.3
post-gymnasium 63632 12.0 29104 12.1
current employment status:
full-time employed 436828 82.6 208944 86.5
long part-time employed 16240 3.1 1182 0.5
short part-time employed 7678 1.5 594 0.2
irregular time employed 17458 3.3 23514 9.7
unemployed 1168 0.2 1230 0.5
own household work 13364 2.5 0 0.0
student 5412 1.0 780 0.3
other non-employed 30774 5.8 5436 2.3
current policy period:
January 1964 - December 1981 127853 24.2 51039 21.1
January 1982 - June 1987 178681 33.8 75948 31.4
July 1987 - December 1993 222388 42.0 114693 47.5
CPI change (for food products only):
< 5.0 % 134925 25.5 56072 23.2
5.0 - 9.9 % 152756 28.9 64110 26.5
> = 10.0 % 241241 45.6 121498 50.3
age of first child (time variable):
< 1 year 56926 10.8 25104 10.4
  1 - 2 years 103148 19.5 46504 19.3
  3 - 5 years 130402 24.7 59608 24.7
  6 - 7 years 70840 13.4 32430 13.4
  8 - 11 years 106538 20.1 49408 20.4
12 - 15 years 61068 11.5 28626 11.8
total: 528922 100.0 241680 100.0Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Table H.4a: Age at first birth, conditional on educational level at first birth.
Hungarian women.
Age age-groups according to education at first birth
compulsory education low vocational school gymnasium post-gymnasium
ages in
years
per cent ages in
years
per cent ages in
years
per cent ages in
years
per cent
very young 14 - 17 16.8 16 - 18 15.7 17 - 19 12.1 20 - 22 13.6
rather young 18 - 19 31.2 19 17.4 20 - 21 30.3 23 - 24 30.3
medium 20 16.4 20 - 21 32.5 22 - 23 24.3 25 17.7
rather old 21 - 22 18.7 22 - 23 18.7 24 - 25 17.8 26 - 27 18.1
oldest 23 - 34 16.9 24 - 34 15.7 26 - 37 15.5 28 - 39 20.3
Total 763 587 859 221
per cent of
total N (2430)
31.4 24.1 35.4 9.1
Table H.4b: Age at first birth, conditional on educational level at first birth.
Hungarian men.
Age age-groups according to education at first birth
compulsory education low vocational school gymnasium post-gymnasium
ages in
years
per cent ages in
years
per cent ages in
years
per cent ages in
years
per cent
very young 17 - 20 22.4 17 - 21 20.7 18 - 22 18.1 21 - 24 20.2
rather young 21 - 22 20.3 22 - 23 24.1 23 - 24 25.3 25 21.2
medium 23 - 24 24.5 24 - 25 22.6 25 - 26 25.6 26 - 27 30.3
rather old 25 - 26 18.8 26 - 27 17.2 27 - 28 16.2 28 - 29 11.1
oldest 27 - 36 14.0 28 - 39 15.4 29 - 39 14.8 30 - 35 17.2
Total 192 482 297 99
per cent of
total N (1070)
17.9 45.0 27.8 9.3Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Table H.5: Composition of the two attitude variables for Hungarian respondents.
I. ”Attitude to parenthood”:
Respondents had to choose the statement with which they agreed most strongly:
A, ”It is the parents’ duty to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being”
B, ”Parents have lives of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for sake of their children”
C, Neither statement
D, Don’t know
Our categories for this variable:
”Child-centered” - those who chose statement A
”Self-centered” - those who chose statement B
”Other” - all other respondents
II. ”Gender-role attitude”:
Agreement or disagreement with the following statements:
1, ”If a single woman wants to have children without living together with a man, she should be allowed to do what she likes.”
2, ”I do not mind any sacrifices in order to have a good relationship with my spouse/partner, even if it jeopardizes my other
goals.”
3, ”My career is very important for me.”
Our categories for this variable:
”Egalitarian” - those who agreed with all three statements
”Traditional” - women who disagreed with statement 1 and 3
- men who disagreed with statement 1 and 2
”Intermediate” - all other respondentsDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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APPENDIX B. Stepwise model presentation
B1. Sweden
Our main findings (for our explanatory variables) are discussed in detail in the main text
of our paper. Here we present the disruption-risk profile for the control variables and for
the time factor.
We started the model fitting with the control variables (Table S.I) referring to
individual characteristics, then we included factors on maturity at family formation. In
the process of adding new groups of control variables to the model, we kept only those
factors from the previous groups that proved to be important for the first-parental-union
break-up in either the female or the male samples (i.e. significantly influenced the
disruption intensity).
Own birth cohort (Model 1), as expected, shows that the risks of family dissolution
increased over cohorts. The patterns are similar in the female and male samples, but the
disruption risks more than doubled for the 1959 and 1964 male cohort compared with
that for the 1949 male cohort, while the increases for female cohorts of the same years
are more moderate. We see, however, a three-fold increase of dissolution risk for the
youngest female cohort as compared with the oldest one. Although cohort influenced
family stability significantly, we did not include it in the next models. Adding age at
first birth in combination of duration since first birth (i.e. age of the first child) as our
time variable would otherwise result in an overdetermined model.
Mother’s religious activity level has a stronger impact on union disruption than that
of father’s, but the patterns are very similar. Those who are religiously active have a
much lower risk of family dissolution than other individuals, as usual.
Childhood family proved to be very important for family stability also in Sweden.
Individuals whose parents divorced before the respondent’s 16
th birthday, have about
twice as high risk of family dissolution as those who came from intact families. The risk
of disruption is also very high for individuals from other non-intact families. There is no
significant difference in the probability of union dissolution between those who
experienced the death of a parent in their childhood and those who were brought up by
both of their parents. As we see in Models 2 - 4 in (Table S.I), childhood family has a
strong direct impact on family stability as its effect hardly changed when we included
factors of maturity at family formation and the rest of the control variables in the model.
A parent’s number of siblings (Model 1) has apparently no influence on family
disruption in Sweden. This suggests that those who came from small families are not
more individualistic and are not less capable of compromises in family life than
individuals who were brought up in larger families.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Maturity at family formation, both in its individual and couple aspects (Model 2),
is important for family stability. Age at first birth (conditional on educational level at
first birth) shows that those who start family formation at younger ages have much
higher risk of union disruption than later starters. This is in line with previous findings
in the literature.
For first-birth interval, we find that the partners should mature together as a couple
before they become parents, for about three years. Those who wait with childbearing
have much more stable families than couples who became parents within relatively short
time after they had moved in together.
Next, we added to the model the rest of the control variables (Models 3 and 4).
With the inclusion of marital status in the model, the effect of religiosity disappeared.
This means that religiosity has no direct impact on family stability in the secularized
Swedish society, only an indirect effect which works through marital status.
First-birth union order has a significant impact on parent’s family stability.
Individuals who had their first child in their second or higher-order union, have more
than 1.5 times as high a risk of family dissolution as those who became parents in their
first co-residential relationship. This, again, is in line with previous findings in the
literature.
Marital status, which is a time-varying covariate as are the control variables we
discuss in the followings,  is another factor of great importance for family stability.
Living in a non-marital consensual union strongly increases the risk of family
dissolution. Direct marriages are the most stable relationships, while marriages
transformed from cohabiting relationships have an intermediary position, as expected.
For number of children in the household (Model 3) we find that those who have
one child only have the highest risk of family disruption among the parents we studied.
There is no significant difference among two-child parents and those with three or more
children in the risks for family break-up. Since our current age of the youngest child
variable controls also for the effect of having one child only (and the effect of the
child’s age is measured then by our time variable), we used this factor instead of number
of children in the household in the further analysis.
Current age of the youngest child (Model 4) also proved to be important for union
stability. The protective effect of having another child in the family works only while
this child is very young, that is below age 1. With children of age 3 and older, the risk of
family dissolution is nearly the same as for one-child families.
Current unemployment rate (Models 3 and 4), which controls for business-cycle
variations, had hardly any influence on family break-up, probably because
unemployment levels were rather low in Sweden during the period covered with our
data. In the male sample however, we see that the relative risk of disruption of the first
parental union is lower in times of slightly higher unemployment rates than otherwise.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Finally, we included our explanatory variables in the model (Table S.II) which are
discussed in details in the main text of our paper (Section 6.1). Thus it only remains to
describe the impact of our time variable, age of the first child. While we hardly see any
changes in union-disruption risks with children below 6 years of age in the female
sample, the male sample produces steeply increasing dissolution intensities from the
first child’s infancy to pre-school years, which thereafter decrease. When the first child
enters her/his teenage years, the risk of family disruption for parents is at the level of
that of just becoming a parent or even lower, ceteris paribus, as seen in both samples.
This may be a selection effect, namely that relationships that did not break up by the
time the first child becomes a teenager are increasingly selected to be more stable than
other unions.
B2. Hungary
As we followed the same procedure for the model fitting for Hungary (Table H.I) as for
Sweden, we discuss first the risks profile for the individual characteristics. The patterns
are quite similar in the female and male samples for  own birth cohort (Model 1).
Disruption risks increased substantially (more than three times) for the youngest cohorts
as compared to the oldest cohorts, like in Sweden. However, we do not find significant
changes in dissolution risks for cohorts born in the 1950s and early 1960s for Hungary,
in contrast to Sweden.
Mothers’ and fathers’  religious activity level shows similar patterns with much
lower disruption risks for those who are religiously active than for others, as usual. The
impact of women’s religiosity is much stronger than is that of men’s, similarly to the
results for Sweden. In contrast to Sweden however, the effect of religiosity on family
stability remains for Hungary even after we added to the model all our control variables
(Models 2 - 4). This suggests that the religiously active individuals are a distinct group
regarding family disruption behavior as compared to other families with children in
Hungary. This also means that the Hungarian society is less secularized than the
Swedish society.
Men’s childhood family does not have a significant impact on family disruption in
Hungary, but the childhood families of women do influence the risk (Model 1). Yet we
see in both samples that those who experienced their parents’ divorce before their 16
th
birthday have much higher disruption risk than those coming from intact families, as in
Sweden. Women who were brought up in other non-intact families have the least stable
families of all as adults. Interestingly, as we included marital status in the model, the
influence of childhood family becomes weaker and appears only for women coming
from other non-intact families (Models 3 and 4). This finding indicates that theDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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daughters of divorced parents probably more often live in consensual unions or
transformed marriages than other women, and thus when we controlled for the type of
the relationship, the influence of parental divorce disappears.
Women’s number of siblings is not important for family stability, but men’s sibship
size is negatively related to the risk of disruption. Hungarian fathers who do not have
any sibling have twice as high risk of family disruption than men with siblings and the
difference is significant (Model 1). These men seem to have fewer skills of solving
problems that arise in a union, or they may be less sensitive to the needs of other family
members. We had no similar finding for Sweden, interestingly though. This might be
explained by the Hungarian society being more traditional than the Swedish especially
regarding gender roles within the family. Only sons are treated differently than only
daughters by their parents. For example, the daughters usually are required to actively
participate in domestic work but not the sons. When there are at least two children in the
family, even the male children learn to pay attention to others and to cooperate.
However, as we added variables that accounted for union-specific characteristics, the
influence of the sibling factor on family stability was reduced and lost significance even
in the male sample (Models 3 and 4). Thus it was not included in our final model (Table
H.II).
In the next step we added the group of variables reflecting maturity at family
formation to the model (Model 2). We find that women’s age at first birth (conditional
on educational level at first birth) has a strong effect on risks of family disruption but
men’s age does not. The results for women’s age at first birth resemble the Swedish
patterns. Those who start family formation at very young ages have much higher risk of
union dissolution than later starters in both countries. For men’s age in Hungary we find
significantly lower disruption risk only for those who became fathers at a medium age,
but not for older ages at first birth.
First-birth interval has little impact on family stability in Hungary in both samples,
unlike in Sweden. This may be explained by a longer dating period before marriage or
non-marital cohabitation in Hungary as compared to Sweden. Because of the housing
shortage, Hungarian couples often have had to search for a long time to find a dwelling
for themselves. Even among married couples, the majority started their lives together in
the home of the parents of one of the spouses (Kamarás 1999). Thus parental consent
may be a condition of young couples’ co-residence, and most parents want to get to
know their children’s partner better before giving their consent. Since the young couples
also have more time to learn to know each other before moving in together, many who
have weak bonds to each other will break up before they can start living together.
Therefore, this variable is a less efficient a measure of the maturity of the partners as a
couple for Hungary than it is for Sweden.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Next we included in the model the rest of the control variables (Models 3 and 4).
Men’s first-birth union order has little influence on family disruption, but women’s
union order does. Nevertheless, the patterns are similar; those who have their first child
in their first co-residential relationship have stabler unions than others, like in Sweden.
As usual, marital status is very influential for family stability. The patterns
resemble the findings for Sweden, even though consensual unions are a tiny fraction of
all families with children in Hungary, and direct marriages represent the typical family
form in contrast to Sweden. Parents who live in consensual unions have a very high
disruption risk in both countries. The most stable relationships are direct marriages, and
marriages which started as consensual unions (i.e. transformed marriages) have an
intermediary position.
Number of children in the household (Model 3) influences family disruption very
strongly for parents in Hungary. Similarly to what is the case in Sweden, one-child
parents have the highest risk of family disruption, and there is no significant difference
between two-child parents and those with more children.
Current age of the youngest child (Model 4) is also an important indicator of
family stability in both countries. When there are at least two children in the family, the
risk of union dissolution increases with the age of the youngest child in both Sweden
and Hungary. Yet, only the disruption intensities of one-child parents are significantly
higher than that of larger families with at least one infant in Hungary.
 CPI change  (Models 3 and 4), which measures the effect of business-cycle
variations, had no influence on family stability in Hungary. As our data covers mostly
the period of state socialism, we can conclude that the relatively stable macro-economic
situation of that time made family-disruption decisions less sensitive to macro-economic
changes. For Sweden, business-cycle variations were somewhat more important for
family stability (as we saw in the male sample), probably due to the differences in the
economic structures of the two countries.
Our final model (Table H.II) shows a somewhat different disruption-risk profile for
the time variable (age of the first child) than the one we saw for Sweden. As the first
child grows older the risk of family dissolution increases for Hungarian parents and
declines somewhat only during the teenage-years of the first child. In Sweden the
disruption intensities decrease already from the early- and middle school-age years of
the first child.
We can only speculate about the reason of the continuously high dissolution risk
for parents with school-age children in Hungary. The educational system in Hungary
strongly encourages competition among children, who constantly face a rather high level
of stress, and they may possibly transfer this to the parents. Thus the tension in the
family would not decrease as the children grow older. If the parents have problems in
their own relationship, this can make the situation worse and in the long run eventuallyDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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cause the break-up of the family. The Swedish school-system is much less competitive,
at least in the first seven grades. Our other explanation relates to the economic
difficulties a family with school-aged children might experience. As children (or their
parents) were expected to buy their textbooks and other school materials in Hungary,
which were more and more expensive as the child progressed in the higher grades, this
was quite a heavy burden on the family budget. As we know financial problems often
create tensions. If the relationship was not strong enough, such tensions could lead to
the dissolution of the union, especially in combination with other types of difficulties. In
Sweden, school materials and books are usually provided free of charge by the school,
at least below secondary-school level. Thus the family’s expenses for education are
relatively limited in Sweden.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Table S.I: Relative risks of dissolution of the first parental union for Swedish women
and men. Models with the control variables.
    (1)   (1)    (2)  (2)    (3)  (3)   (4)  (4)
women men women men women men women men






religiosity (activity level): (p = 0.024) (p = 0.167) (p = 0.015) (p = 0.127) (p = 0.339) (p = 0.757) (p = 0.366) (p = 0.720)
active 0.64** 0.59 0.62** 0.56 0.82 0.87 0.83 0.85
not active 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
childhood family: (p = 0.000) (p = 0.004) (p = 0.000) (p = 0.001) (p = 0.000) (p = 0.004) (p = 0.000) (p = 0.003)
intact family 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
parents divorced 1.85*** 2.03*** 1.92*** 2.11*** 1.83*** 1.90*** 1.82*** 1.90***
parent died 1.15 0.66 1.06 0.48 1.03 0.48 1.03 0.46
other non-intact family 1.88*** 2.36** 1.98*** 2.20** 1.71** 2.10** 1.70** 2.13**




three or more 1.21 0.90
age at first birth
(conditional on education
at first birth):
(p = 0.079) (p = 0.025) (p = 0.001) (p = 0.008) (p = 0.001) (p = 0.006)
very young 1 1 1 1 1 1
rather young 0.90 0.81 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.82
medium 0.84 0.70 0.76* 0.66* 0.76* 0.66*
rather old 0.68** 0.43*** 0.58*** 0.40*** 0.58*** 0.40***
oldest 0.60*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.36*** 0.44*** 0.35***
first-birth interval: (p = 0.000) (p = 0.196) (p = 0.001) (p = 0.464) (p = 0.001) (p = 0.510)
< 8 months 1 1 1 1 1 1
  8 - 17 months 0.90 1.18 0.92 1.11 0.92 1.11
18 - 35 months 0.78 1.02 0.82 1.08 0.82 1.07
36 - 59 months 0.43*** 0.80 0.49*** 0.99 0.49*** 0.98
60 + months 0.52*** 0.53 0.63** 0.57 0.63** 0.58
first-birth union order: (p = 0.000) (p = 0.007) (p = 0.000) (p = 0.006)
1 1 1 1 1
2 + 1.82*** 1.92*** 1.82*** 1.93***
marital status: (p = 0.000) (p = 0.000) (p = 0.000) (p = 0.000)
consensual union 1.80*** 2.09*** 1.81*** 2.18***
transformed marriage 1 1 1 1
direct marriage 0.55*** 0.82 0.54*** 0.81
no. of children in the
household:
(p = 0.000) (p = 0.034)
one 1.83*** 1.45*
two 1 1
three or more 0.97 0.61
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Table S.I (continuation):
    (1)   (1)    (2)  (2)    (3)  (3)   (4)  (4)
women men women men women men women men
current age of the
youngest child:
(p = 0.000) (p = 0.008)
< 1 year 1 1
1 - 2 years 2.01*** 1.99*
3 - 5 years 2.39*** 3.18***
6 + years 2.07** 3.28***





(p = 0.521) (p = 0.192) (p = 0.573) (p = 0.180)
< 2.0% 1 1 1 1
2.0% - 2.9% 0.97 0.73* 0.97 0.72*
>= 3.0% 1.12 0.76 1.11 0.75
age of first child (time
factor):
(p = 0.003) (p = 0.032) (p = 0.000) (p = 0.002) (p = 0.054) (p = 0.005) (p = 0.015) (p = 0.001)
< 1 year 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
  1 - 2 years 1.26 1.89** 1.19 1.74* 1.44** 2.04** 1.50*** 2.19***
  3 - 5 years 1.05 2.37*** 0.92 1.88** 1.63*** 3.05*** 1.61*** 3.22***
  6 - 11 years 0.70* 1.81* 0.55*** 1.15 1.25 2.56*** 1.07 1.93*
12 - 15 years 0.81 1.25 0.55*** 0.66 1.40 1.63 1.19 1.05
[0.694] [0.327] [1.946] [0.879] [0.667] [0.391] [0.384] [0.185]
log likelihood -2967.8 -1221.5 -2952.6 -1221.0 -2909.2 -1201.8 -2903.7 -1198.3
no. of independent
parameters
    16     14      17      17      24      24      26      26
***  significant at the 1%-level, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
Note: For each variable, risks and their significance are given relative to the reference level, indicated by 1 (no decimals). The p-
value of the entire factor is given in the row containing the variable name. Absolute risk (per 1000 person-half-months) for age
< 1 year of the first child is given in the last row of the time factor in boldface letter.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Table S.II: Relative risks of dissolution of the first parental union for Swedish women
and men. Final model.
women men
childhood family: (p = 0.001) (p = 0.022)
intact family 1 1
parents divorced 1.63*** 1.73**
parent died 0.93 0.49
other non-intact family 1.69** 1.82
age at first birth (conditional on educational level at first birth): (p = 0.000) (p = 0.000)
very young 1 1
medium (incl. rather young) 0.77** 0.73
older (i.e. rather old and oldest) 0.48*** 0.33***
first-birth interval: (p = 0.004) (p = 0.130)
< 3 years 1 1
3 - 4 years 0.61*** 0.88
5 + years 0.79 0.50**
first-birth union order: (p = 0.000) (p = 0.026)
1 1 1
2 + 1.75*** 1.71**
marital status: (p = 0.000) (p = 0.000)
non-marital consensual union 1.80*** 1.99***
transformed marriage 1 1
direct marriage 0.55*** 0.74
current age of the youngest child: (p = 0.066) (p = 0.004)
< 1 year 1 1
1 - 2 years 1.61* 1.96*
3 - 5 years 1.83** 3.29***
6 + years 1.53 3.22***
only one child in the household 2.04*** 3.16***




current policy period: (p = 0.091) (p = 0.014)
Jan. 1964 - Dec. 1973 0.92 0.91
Jan. 1974 - June 1983 1 1
July 1983 - June 1993 1.30** 1.74***
current educational attainment: (p = 0.003) (p = 0.284)
compulsory education 1 1




¤: (p = 0.000) (p = 0.116)
full-time employed 1 1
long part-time employed 0.76* 1.81
short part-time employed 0.41*** 3.26*
on parental leave 0.45***
own household work 0.60***
unemployed 0.87 3.10**
student 1.51* 1.18
other non-employed 0.47*** 0.86




age of first child (time variable): (p = 0.022) (p = 0.000)
< 1 year 1 1
  1 - 2 years 1.07 2.21***
  3 - 5 years 0.99 3.30***
  6 - 11 years 0.61** 1.76
12 - 15 years 0.58* 0.80
[1.445] [0.177]
log likelihood -2870.3 -1189.7
no. of independent parameters      33       31
***  significant at the 1%-level, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
Note: For each variable, risks and their significance are given relative to the reference level, indicated by 1 (no decimals). The p-
value of the entire factor is given in the row containing the variable name. Absolute risk (per 1000 person-half-months) for age
< 1 year of the first child is given in the last row of the time factor in boldface letter.
¤  The categories ”on parental leave” and ”own household work” for men are included in the ”other non-employed” category.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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 Table H.I: Relative risks of dissolution of the first parental union for Hungarian
women and men. Models with the control variables.
    (1)   (1)    (2)  (2)    (3)  (3)   (4)  (4)
women men women men women men women men
own birth cohort: (p = 0.003) (p = 0.142)
w: 1951-52; m: 1949-53 1 1
w: 1953-57; m: 1954-58 1.36 0.71
w: 1958-62; m: 1959-63 1.39 0.97
w: 1963-67; m: 1964-68 1.74** 1.08
w: 1968-72; m: 1969-73 3.31*** 4.07*
religiosity (activity level): (p = 0.002) (p = 0.274) (p = 0.002) (p = 0.290) (p = 0.003) (p = 0.477) (p = 0.003) (p = 0.501)
active 0.58*** 0.68 0.58*** 0.69 0.59*** 0.77 0.59*** 0.79
not active 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
childhood family: (p = 0.024) (p = 0.202) (p = 0.028) (p = 0.188) (p = 0.071) (p = 0.349) (p = 0.069) (p = 0.315)
intact family 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
parents divorced 1.38* 1.62 1.35* 1.59 1.22 1.27 1.23 1.29
other non-intact family 1.55** 0.60 1.57** 0.56 1.54** 0.53 1.54** 0.52
number of siblings: (p = 0.672) (p = 0.052) (p = 0.846) (p = 0.073) (p = 0.962) (p = 0.134) (p = 0.964) (p = 0.126)
none 1.14 2.13*** 1.09 2.08*** 1.07 1.90** 1.07 1.92**
one 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
two 1.11 1.37 1.07 1.32 1.06 1.35 1.06 1.35
three or more 1.18 1.45 1.13 1.36 1.06 1.36 1.06 1.36
age at first birth
(conditional on education
at first birth):
(p = 0.000) (p = 0.264) (p = 0.001) (p = 0.293) (p = 0.001) (p = 0.305)
very young 1 1 1 1 1 1
rather young 0.56*** 0.74 0.63*** 0.74 0.63*** 0.76
medium 0.52*** 0.61* 0.61*** 0.61* 0.61*** 0.61*
rather old 0.46*** 0.98 0.52*** 0.94 0.52*** 0.95
oldest 0.52*** 1.14 0.49*** 1.11 0.49*** 1.13
first-birth interval: (p = 0.316) (p = 0.340)
< 8 months 1 1
  8 - 17 months 0.99 1.27
18 - 35 months 1.24 0.91
36 - 59 months 1.38 0.69
60 + months 0.85 1.60
first-birth union order: (p = 0.078) (p = 0.737) (p = 0.093) (p = 0.745)
1 1 1 1 1
2 + 1.68* 1.16 1.64* 1.16
marital status: (p = 0.000) (p = 0.002) (p = 0.000) (p = 0.002)
consensual union 2.27*** 3.15* 2.25*** 3.15*
transformed marriage 1 1 1 1
direct marriage 0.60*** 0.52*** 0.59*** 0.51***
no. of children in the
household:
(p = 0.000) (p = 0.000)
one 2.23*** 2.59***
two 1 1
three or more 0.87 0.94
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Table H.I (continuation)
    (1)   (1)    (2)  (2)    (3)  (3)   (4)  (4)
women men women men women men women men
current age of the
youngest child:
(p = 0.000) (p = 0.000)
< 1 year 1 1
1 - 2 years 0.91 1.67
3 - 5 years 1.17 2.06
6 + years 1.61 2.65





(p = 0.644) (p = 0.570) (p = 0.636) (p = 0.546)
< 5.0% 1 1 1 1
5.0% - 9.9% 0.95 0.90 0.95 0.90
>= 10.0% 0.88 0.77 0.88 0.77
age of first child (time
factor):
(p = 0.483) (p = 0.804) (p = 0.583) (p = 0.894) (p = 0.001) (p = 0.049) (p = 0.003) (p = 0.081)
< 1 year 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
  1 - 2 years 0.98 1.52 0.93 1.45 1.10 1.75 1.11 1.80
  3 - 5 years 1.14 1.54 1.00 1.37 1.61** 2.44** 1.71*** 2.59***
  6 - 11 years 1.25 1.48 1.02 1.29 2.08*** 2.95*** 1.94*** 2.76***
12 - 15 years 0.95 1.32 0.74 1.20 1.69* 3.07** 1.36 2.57*
[0.362] [0.266] [0.951] [0.305] [0.642] [0.219] [0.553] [0.117]
log likelihood -2767.5 -954.2 -2763.0 -952.6 -2728.7 -938.2 -2726.1 -936.9
no. of independent
parameters
    15    15      19    19      22    22      24    24
***  significant at the 1%-level, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
Note: For each variable, risks and their significance are given relative to the reference level, indicated by 1 (no decimals). The p-
value of the entire factor is given in the row containing the variable name. Absolute risk (per 1000 person-half-months) for age
< 1 year of the first child is given in the last row of the time factor in boldface letter.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 2
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Table H.II: Relative risks of dissolution of the first parental union for Hungarian
women and men. Final model.
women men
religiosity (activity level): (p = 0.004) (p = 0.681)
active 0.60*** 0.86
not active 1 1
childhood family: (p = 0.119) (p = 0.327)
intact family 1 1
parents divorced 1.16 1.25
other non-intact family 1.49** 0.51
age at first birth (conditional on educational level at first birth): (p = 0.000) (p = 0.082)
very young 1 1
medium (incl. rather young) 0.61*** 0.59**
older (i.e. rather old and oldest) 0.47*** 0.80
first-birth union order: (p = 0.074) (p = 0.560)
1 1 1
2 + 1.69* 1.30
marital status: (p = 0.000) (p = 0.013)
non-marital consensual union 2.41*** 2.43
transformed marriage 1 1
direct marriage 0.59*** 0.56**
current age of the youngest child: (p = 0.000) (p = 0.000)
0 - 2 years 1 1
3 + years 1.38* 1.59
only one child in the household 2.73*** 3.50***








current policy period: (p = 0.168) (p = 0.490)
Jan. 1964 - Dec. 1981 1 1
Jan. 1982 - June 1987 1.34* 1.41
July 1987 - Dec. 1993 1.22 1.33
current educational attainment: (p = 0.148) (p = 0.317)
compulsory education 1 1
lower level vocational school 1.13 0.65*
gymnasium 0.83 0.60*
post-gymnasium 0.82 0.64
current employment status: (p = 0.049) (p = 0.223)
full-time employed (incl. irregular time employed) 1 1
part-time employed (i.e. long and short part-time employed) 0.75 4.17**
own household work 1.50
unemployed 1.81
student 0.60** 3.62
other non-employed (incl. unemployed for women only) 0.36* 1.53




age of first child (time variable): (p = 0.026) (p = 0.125)
< 1 year 1 1
  1 - 2 years 1.09 1.78
  3 - 5 years 1.57** 2.55**
  6 - 11 years 1.73*** 2.54**
12 - 15 years 1.30 2.36*
[0.523] [0.179]
log likelihood -2716.9 -933.9
no. of independent parameters      28     28
***  significant at the 1%-level, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
Note: For each variable, risks and their significance are given relative to the reference level, indicated by 1 (no decimals). The p-
value of the entire factor is given in the row containing the variable name. Absolute risk (per 1000 person-half-months) for age
< 1 year of the first child is given in the last row of the time factor in boldface letter.